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Abstract 
Water and sanitation services (WSS) have been mostly provided in Italy (and in Europe) at the 
municipal level. WSS are highly capital intensive. How water and sanitation infrastructure has been 
financed by Italian municipalities? What were the financing tools implemented to cover the huge 
investments’ costs in the short run? Who were the final end-payers in the long run?  
In Italy intergovernmental financial relations between municipalities and the central state changed 
significantly from 1861 till now : fiscal autonomy or dependence from central state transfers, balanced 
budget obligation or not, degree of borrowing autonomy. Water supply and sanitation legislation was 
largely modified too through the 20th century in Italy. The evolution of both intergovernmental 
financial relations and water supply and sanitation legislation is a useful background element to our 
work. 
The major part of our paper is focused on a detailed analysis of the rolling-up phase of Milan modern 
water and sanitation service (1888-1924). A variety of implemented financing schemes and 
institutional solutions (municipal budget - fiscal resources, municipal bond and land added value 
capture schemes) are identified and described. The financial equilibrium of the WSS is analysed. A 
basic overlapping generation model is used to explore how the infrastructure costs have been allocated 
between the various generations. 
The last part of our paper adds a long run perspective (1953-2000) to the detailed analysis undertaken 
in the first part of the paper. Once the rolling-up phase has gone how was the infrastructure provided, 
expanded and financed over the 50 years after WWII ? What was the financial equilibrium of WSS ? 
Was it financed by municipal budget fiscal revenues or relying only on tariff revenues ? A discussion 
on the long run cost allocation and on the intergenerational transfers is made. 
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1 Introduction 
In many developing countries water services are still in a phase of development and network 
expansion. The water industry is very capital intensive and requires huge lump sum 
investments particularly in the early phase of expanding the infrastructure. In a historical 
perspective how to finance these investments has constantly been a major concern, not always 
easy to solve. We make the assumption that adopting a “long run” historical perspective on 
water financing as we do in the present paper can be highly beneficial to give more depth to 
the present policy debate and enlighten present and future challenges both in developing 
countries and in Europe. 
Water and sanitation services (WSS) have been mostly provided in Italy (and in Europe) at 
the municipal level. WSS are highly capital intensive particularly in the networks’ expansion 
phase. How water and sanitation infrastructure rolling-up and provision has been undertaken 
and financed by Italian municipalities ? This paper is focused on the case study of Milan’s 
water and sanitation service from its genesis as a “modern” service in 1888 to the year 2000.   
A first and significant part of our paper (sections 2 to 8) is focused on a detailed analysis of 
the rolling-up phase of Milan modern water and sanitation service (1888-19243) using the 
municipality’s yearly financial report4 as the main data source. Water infrastructure’s 
expansion took place in the context of a massive economic and demographic urban 
development (described in section 2). Section 3 analyses the key technical and institutional 
choices which were made in the rolling-up phase. 
Section 4 is focused instead on the water and sanitation infrastructure brought to completion 
and to the invested amounts. Water and sanitation investments were huge even if compared to 
the city’s development masterplan ones (§4.4). 
Water and sanitation in Milan (and in Italy) is very much a municipal story. How did the 
municipality manage to finance such a costly infrastructure ? To tackle such a question the 
Italian municipal fiscal regime is described (section 5) with a detailed focus on Milan’s 
                                                 
 
3
 After 1924 the fascist regime abolished the autonomy of Italian municipalities (ordinamento podestarile). In 
those years Milan municipal budget and reports are not available anymore. 
4
 Conto consuntivo dell’anno 
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municipality financial constraints (§5.4). Land value capture tools are given a specific 
attention too (§5.2 and §5.3). 
Rolling up an infrastructure requires vast amounts of money to be quickly available. What 
were the financing tools implemented to cover the huge investments’ costs in the short run?  
What was the borrowing regime of Italian Municipalities like (§ 6.1) ? What were the deficit 
financing tools implemented in Milan (§ 6.2, §6.3 and §6.4)?   
Who were the final end-payers in the long run? Refering to the OECD 3T’s methodology, 
were they the users or the tax payers ? To tackle such a question section 7 is focused on how 
water and sanitation service was charged to the users while Section 8 analyses in details the 
financial flows of the water and sanitation service using figures from the yearly municipal 
financial report and determines whether Tariff revenues were covering the full service cost or 
not. The key role played by long term debt and inflation is analysed too (§ 8.6). To discuss 
who were the end-payers and to estimate the intergenerational transfers a basic overlapping 
generation model is implemented (§ 8.7 and § 8.8) to explore how the infrastructure costs are 
allocated between the various generations. 
The last section (section 9) adds a long run perspective (1953-2000) to the detailed analysis 
undertaken in the first part of the paper. Once the rolling-up phase has gone how was the 
infrastructure provided, expanded and financed over the 50 years after WWII ? In Italy 
intergovernmental financial relations between municipalities and the central state changed 
significantly through the 20th century (fiscal autonomy or dependence from central state 
transfers, balanced budget obligation or not). An overview of the evolution of 
intergovernmental financial relations in Italy is given in § 9.1 as a long run prosecution of 
what has been discussed in sections 5 and 6. The evolution of the regulation of the water and 
sanitation services in Italy is also described in § 9.2 The lasts paragraphs are focused instead 
on the financial flows of Milan’s water and sanitation service over the 1953-2000 time period. 
The (im)balance between Tariff revenues and OPEX is analysed in § 9.3. The investment 
policy is described too (§ 9.4). Finally the intergenerational cost-sharing over the whole time 
frame (1888-2000) is estimated using two different methods (§ 9.5).   
2 Economic and administrative context 
2.1 Economic context 
At Italy’s unification in 1861, Milan had only 196 109 inhabitants, less than Naples (447 000) 
and Turin (204 000). The city’s industry was underdeveloped and still mainly composed of 
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small manufactures producing goods for the local market since under the Austrian 
administration exportation of products from Lombardy to other parts of the Austrian empire 
were not incentivized at all (Boriani 1982). 
In 1861 Milan was probably not ready yet to become Italy’s economic capital. However 
between 1859 and 1878 however Milan became the major Italian railway station as italian 
railways developed massively increasing their length from 1750 km to 9657 km. Furthermore 
in 1881 the first national exhibition took place in Milan instead of Rome showing 
symbolically its rank of major Italian city (Campos Venuti 1986, 10). Between 1881 and 1911 
major economic development took place in Milan with the birth of key Italian industries: Riva 
(1889), Carlo Erba (1892), Tecnomasio Brown Boveri and Breda (1903), Marelli (1905), 
Pirelli, Falck and Alfa Romeo (1906) (Boriani 1982, 60). 
With the birth of large industries, Milan’s population grew massively also due to immigration 
from rural areas of Lombardy and Veneto regions (Campos Venuti 1986). In 1911 there were 
more inhabitants in Milan (590 000) than in Turin (427 106) and Rome (511 076) and the 
population gap with Naples (678 091) was much smaller than in 1861. By 1931 Milan had a 
greater population (992 036) than all other Italian cities except Rome (1 008 083).  
2.2 Administrative areas 
 In 1861 Milan’s municipality administrative area was quite small (area 1 + area 2 in Figure 
1) and limited by the “Spanish walls” (le mura spagnole or bastioni) schematized by the green 
circle on the map below (Figure 1). The inner red circle on the map represents the navigli5 
(canals) circle. The mainly rural area outside the Spanish walls had previously been integrated 
by Napoleon’s ruling (1797-1814) within Milan’s administrative area. It had been splitted up 
again by the Austrian administration (1815-1859) which had created the rural municipality of 
I Corpi Santi (just outside of the green circle in the map). Looking further away from the I 
Corpi Santi the administrative fragmentation was even larger. In 1861 a total of 30 
municipalities existed within the nowadays surface of Milan’s municipality (Buzzi Donato 
1969, 5). 
 
 
                                                 
 
5
 Many decades later the navigli were covered in 1929 - 1930 and then filled-in in 1968 – 1969 due to serious 
structural degradation which had compromised the canals’ roof stability (Gentile, Brown, and Spadoni 1990, 28). 
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Figure 1 : The Beruto city’s development master plan  
3
2
1
 
Source : author’s elaboration, original map from Beruto (1885) 
 
Goods (at least most of them) entering in the municipality of Milan were subjected to an 
excise-duty6 (cf § 5.2). Due to such a fiscal imbalance new industries and productive activities 
started to develop outside Milan administrative area rather than inside (Campos Venuti 1986). 
As a fact during the first ten years after Italy’s unification there was a much higher population 
growth rate in the Corpi Santi municipality than in Milan as the table below shows. 
I Corpi Santi where annexated to Milan’s administrative area in 1873 but obtained in turn an 
exemption from the excise-duty. Such an exemption was maintained until 1898 (§5.4).  
                                                 
 
6
 In fact the excise barrier (dazio di consumo) was the dividing line between Milan municipality and I Corpi 
Santi. 
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50 years later, in 1923, 11 other municipalities7  were annexated8 giving to Milan roughly the 
same size it has nowadays (18 176 ha while it had a surface of 7600 ha prior to 1923) and 
increasing significantly its population too (Table below). 
Table 1 : Inhabitants in Milan’s administrative areas 
 
area 
(ha) 1861 1871 1881 1901 1911 1921 1931 
Area within the 
Spanish walls 823 196 109 199 009 214 000 246 000 235 000 255 000 225 000 
Corpi Santi 67779  46 000 
93 000 
108 000 246 000 365 000 463 800 
767 036 Other External 
municipalities 17 353 26 891 35 000 48 000 99 000 115 200 
Milan municipality   - 196 109 199 009 322 000 492 000 590 000 718 800 992 036 
Total area (Milan 
nowadays area) 18 176 269 000 292 000 357 000  540 000 699 000 835 000 992 036 
Source : author’s elaboration, all data from Buzzi Donato (1969, 52), Corpi Santi line from Boriani (1982) 
 
2.3 City’s development masterplans   
Through the first half of the 19th century Milan urban layout had not been modified that much 
except for the urban renovation operations initiated under Napoleon ruling (Foro Buonaparte, 
Arena and Via Dante) and stopped afterwards during Austrian administration. It was mainly 
after 1861 that expensive urban renovation operations were undertaken in the city center to 
give a more prestigious image to the city (Piazza Duomo, the new Galleria, new axis such as 
via Torino, via Manzoni and via Meravigli).  
While municipal renovation effort was focused on the city center, conversely in the external 
areas of expansion Milan’s development took place at first in a spontaneous and unruled way. 
Things changed only in 1889 when a city’s development master plan10 (Piano regolatore) 
                                                 
 
7
 Baggio, Trenno, Musocco, Affori, Niguarda, Greco, Gorla, Crescenzago, Lambrate, Chiaravalle, Vigentino 
8
 The debate on such an annexation started already in 1889 and was approved by the city’s council in 1897 (Sai 
et al. 1970, 119). It took more than 25 more years to be implemented (in 1923).   
9
 The surface of Milan’s municipality (including Corpi Santi) between 1873 and 1923 was of 7600 ha (Gentile, 
Brown, and Spadoni 1990, 110). 
10
 The municipal board led by mayor Bellinzaghi was forced to resign in 1884 when discussing the city’s 
municipal masterplan. Mayor Bellinzaghi was bargaining with the Società Fondiaria on an agreement on a urban 
renovation in the Piazza d’Armi area. Incredibly the discussed deal implied to partially demolish the city’s castle 
(Castello Sforzesco). Lucky enough the Ministry of Education vetoed it. Corruption suspicions were also 
reported by the press as mayor Bellinzaghi was accused of receiveing 2 million Lira for the deal (Sai et al. 1970, 
15,57,78).  
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designed by Engineer Beruto was approved by the Italian parliament11 after having been 
adopted by the city’s council in 1886. 
The Beruto master plan (Figure 1) was focused on the development of the recently annexated 
city’s area (area 3 outside the Spanish walls) rather than on pursuing major urban renovation 
in the old inner area of the city. One of the main guidelines of the Beruto plan was the choice 
to extend in the new expansion area of the city a road structure made of radial axis and 
concentric ring roads. Such a feature is still noticeable nowadays in Milan and in our paper we 
will frequently refer to the three concentric areas (1 circle and 2 annuli) sketched in Figure 1.  
Urbanization took place very quickly and by 1910 it had overtaken Beruto’s plan limits. In 
1912 a new city’s development masterplan was approved (Piano di ampliamento Pavia - 
Masera).  
2.4 Milan’s housing conditions 
It is interesting to point out some facts on Milan’s social conditions (particularly housing 
conditions) through the decades we are analyzing. Milan’s massive demographic rate of those 
years implied a high demand of houses (particularly high was the demand of low rent houses 
among the immigrants and the working class). Altough the undertaken urban renovation 
operations improved and modernized the city’s center, they also had a negative social effects 
since they required to demolish a significant number of areas where low income people were 
living. Most of the inhabitants had to resettle in the outskirts thus increasing the housing 
demand (Campos Venuti 1986).  
As a matter of fact the housing offer was not sufficient implying a tension on the rent prices 
and on overcrowding of houses. The spatial variability of overcrowding was great as in 1861 
the average overcrowding rate was of  1.04 people per room in the city center (within the 
Spanish walls) and 2.13 outside of it. Overcrowding was even greater in the smaller flats (up 
to three rooms) with an average of 1.75 people per room within the Spanish walls and 2.71 
people per room outside of the Spanish walls. 
The building rate figures (Table 2) show that built area increased massively only after 1901 
and particularly in the 1901-1911 decade. Those figures partially reflect the social housing 
                                                 
 
11
 The public utility declaration decrees were approved by the parliament the 29th April 1888 and the 11 July 
1889. 
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policy adopted by the municipality after 1901 and particularly after the 1903 and 190812 law 
(Legge 31 maggio 1903 n°264, Legge 2 gennaio 1908 n°5). Between 1905 and 1912, 6000 
social housing rooms were built while between 1920 and 1924 the Istituto autonomo per le 
Case Popolari brought to completion 6189 rooms (Buzzi Donato 1969, 19). 
Table 2 : Trend on built area in Milan (1881 – 1921) 
year Entire municipality Within the the Spanish walls Out of the Spanish walls 
m2 Index :  1881 value = 100 
1881 7 161 154 100 100 100 
1891 8 092 105 113 102 230 
1901 9 667 559 135 104 351 
1911 14 537 144 203 107 750 
1921 16 542 268 231 106 923 
Source : Buzzi Donato (1969, 17) 
 
In 1926 however the mean crowding indicator value in the city was still of 1.22 people per 
room with a peak value of 1.81 people per room among the working class. A major spatial 
variability was noticeable not only in housing conditions but also in income differences as the 
average income in the most poor peripheric area represented roughly 2% of the average 
income in the richer part of the city centre (Buzzi Donato 1969, 12).  
In 1931 more than 80 % of the working class was still living in crowded or overcrowded 
houses while the percentage was roughly of 50 % for non-working class. Conversely 48 % of 
non-working class were living in uncrowded houses while this percentage was of only 14 % 
for working class (refer to table below). Indeed these figures on the housing conditions show 
that although a massive urban development had taken place in Milan in those decades, this 
had implied harsh inequalities in social and living conditions between the various city’s 
citizen. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
12
 Indeed only minor social housing projects had been undertaken in the 19th century : Via S. Marco, Moscova, 
Montebello in 1861, Via Conservatorio, Pta Vittoria e via Benedetto Marcello in 1875. Between 1901 and 1911 
social housing was undertaken by the Società Umanitaria. In 1908 the Istituto autonomo per le Case Popolari 
was created by the municipality (Buzzi Donato 1969, 17). 
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Table 3 : Houses overcrowding in 1931 : number of inhabitants per category of houses and social class 
  Uncrowded houses Crowded houses 
Over 
crowded 
houses 
total 
crowding indicator 
(n° of people/room) x<1  1<x<2 x>2   
houses inhabited by 
working class 
  
54 280 166 001 158 013 378 294 
14.35% 43.88% 41.77% 100% 
houses not inhabited 
by working class 
  
263 565 196 926 82 500 542 991 
48.54% 36.27% 15.19% 100% 
total 
317 845 362 927 240 513 921 285 
34.50% 39.39% 26.11% 100% 
Source : Buzzi Donato (Buzzi Donato 1969, 22) 
 
3 Rolling up a modern water  and sanitation service  
3.1 Far away water versus water from below the city ? 
Milan is located in the middle of the Pianura Padana lowland with no river flowing through 
the city. However a system of canals (the so called navigli) had been built through the  
centuries for navigation’s purpose. It also allowed to bring draw water to the city. 
In the second half of the 19th century there was still no modern water supply system in Milan. 
Water from the navigli was used for all non-drinking usages while drinking water came from 
private shallow wells (Bigatti 1997, 29) since the city lies on an abundant aquifer. Most of the 
wells were excavated down to 6-7 m depth although there were also a few bore-hole drilled 
down to 10-12 m depth (ATO Città di Milano 2007, 78). Water was available in large 
quantities and some buildings had pumps installed which made water available upstairs 
(Colombo 1984, 119). 
In 1856 the City’s council appointed a committee to study and design a project to build 
fountains in various parts of the city. It is significant that the project’s scope was to build new 
public fountains and not a modern water supply network as in many other European cities; 
such might be paradigmatic of how Italian cities were far behind European cities to tackle the 
concerns created by urban growth (Bigatti 1997, 122) . 
Through the 1870’s however ground water quality started to worsen and many scientific 
studies showed the link between its pollution and the quantity of waste water discharged in 
the ground which was significantly increasing due to the extraordinary urban growth 
(Colombo 1984, 119).  
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Through the years the scientific and decision making circle became progressively aware that 
the vicious spiral of waste water polluting the aquifer from which water was withdrawn had to 
be broken up13. According to the water quantity paradigm (Barraqué 2003b), which was 
mainstream at that time in Western Europe, clean water had to be found and brought to the 
city from far away sources.  According to this line of thought a call for water supply projects 
was launched in 1881 by Milan’s municipality. The scope was not only to find the best way to 
deliver far away water to the city but also to “allow the European monetary markets to furnish 
capitals to build such an infrastructure14”.   
Among the 12 projects in competition the municipal commission ranked first a project by the 
Società Italiana condotte d’acqua (linked to the Banco di Roma) and a contract was signed. 
The project planned to channel spring water nearby the Brembo River and to reach Milan 
through a 45 km gravity aqueduct plus a 25 km pressure pipeline. A public utility declaration 
from the Ministry of public works was needed to allow the land expropriation and start the 
project. The inhabitants of the Brembo valley fiercely opposed15  themselves to the project. 
Various people and institutions took part to the debate as Colombo (1984, 120) reports. In 
1885 the ministry ends up not awarding the public utility declaration for the project16.  
Milan’s municipality terminated the contract with the Società Italiana condotte d’acqua and 
launched in 1887 a new call for projects much more detailed than the first one. Mainstream 
thinking had changed through the time and spring water was not anymore a priori preferred to 
ground water. On the contrary the call for projects asked to any bidder to engage himself both 
in a long-term water supply project through the technical solution it would prefer and in a 
temporary water supply from ground water. Such an original twofold approach shows that 
decision makers were now open to ground water usage although they still considered it as a 
secondary and temporary solution17. 22 projects were in competition and evaluated by the 
                                                 
 
13
 “Tutto all’aves! Si potrebbe dire il sistema di fognatura della città, volendo darne una succinta definizione 
quantunque esagerata…E l’acqua da bere? Tutta dall’aves! Ecco il ciclo che devesi assolutamente 
interrompere” Felice Poggi, quoted by Colombo (1984, 119)  
14
 “Permettendo i mercati monetari europei di associare capitali per l’esecuzione di tal genere di intraprese” 
(Municipio di Milano 1881; quoted by Colombo 1984)  
15
 The Brembo valley is located in the Bergamo region. It is well known that Bergamo and Milan have 
historically been in rivalry 
16
 Lettera del maggio 1885 in cui il Consiglio Superiore dei Lavori Pubblici rifiuta la dichiaraz di publica utilita 
per la conduttura d’acqua verso Milano delle sorgenti della Val Brembo, reported in (Motta 1989a).   
17
 Relazione e proposta sul contratto 10 dicembre 1881 intervenuto colla Società Italiana per condotte d’acque 
sedente in Roma per la conduttura d’acqua potabile in servizio della città di Milano, Marzo 1887 
  
13
municipal commission which however was unable to make a choice. An advice was asked to 
Mr Burkli, chief engineer of the Zurich municipal water service which argued strongly in 
favor of the ground water choice and against the concession to a private operator18. We shall 
see in next paragraph that Mr Burkli’s advice was followed. 
3.2 Water 
In July 1888 the City’s council chose to experiment a water supply pilot project which had 
been designed by the young engineer Felice Poggi within the municipal technical department 
(ufficio tecnico comunale). According to such a project a few deep bore holes were to be 
drawed, a pumping station installed and a one km pipeline was to be laid (Comune di Milano 
1888).  
Supplying the city with underground water was still seen by the city’s council as a temporary 
solution easily and quickly implementable which would allow to wait for the definitive 
solution which in their opinion should consist in long-distance aqueducts bringing “clean” 
water to the city. Although Mr Burkli had suggested to choose underground water (§3.1), 
Milan city counsellors were still convinced that water from far away sources had to be 
brought to the city since it was supposed to be superior to local underground water19. In the 
second half of 1888 two pilot boreholes were realized next to the Arena (reaching respectively 
146,43 and 81.75 m of depth) and in 1889 a steam engine pumping station was installed20 
(140 l/s of discharge). Roughly 1200 m of pipelines were laid in order to supply water to the 
Piazza Castello - Foro Buonaparte - Via Dante residential area21 recently built (Appendix 
3a).  
Such a pilot project met success and an investment plan concerning water supply was 
approved by the city’s council in 1890 going further in the choice of using underground water 
which was not anymore seen as temporary solution. Capital expenditures over 10 years were 
                                                 
 
18
 Relazione inviata dall’ing Burkli, ingegnere capo delle Acque Pubbliche di Zurigo, a Gaetano Negri, sindaco 
di Milano, published in Motta (1989a) 
19
 This a clear example of the first of the three paradigms (“water quantity paradigm”) through which water 
engineering history can be framed according to Bernard Barraqué (2003b).  
20
 Notwithstanding the depth of the two experimental wells, pression conditions in the aquifer allowed water to 
reach naturally a 3 to 4 m depth below ground. Pumps were only necessary to elevate water from a 3 to 4 meters 
depth.     
21
 The project of urban expansion in the Foro Buonaparte area had been initiated under Napoleon’s ruling, it had 
stopped under Austrian ruling and was brought to completion after 1861 (§ 2.3). The Foro Buonaparte area was 
a chosen as pilot area to experiment both the water and sanitation services. Some information on such urban 
renovation operation are given in § 5.3 and appendix 3a. 
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estimated in 2 650 000 lira as the sum of 250 000 lira allocated to pumping stations, 
connections and buildings and 2 400 000 lira for the water distribution network (Municipio di 
Milano 1891a, 34). 
Thanks to its location on the top of an abundant aquifer the city of Milan was able to make the 
sound decision of building only basic water infrastructure (wells, pumps and pipelines). 
Additionally, the chosen technical solution had also the great advantage of being very flexible 
and gradual in its implementation. Indeed a solution based on a large long distance aqueduct 
would have implied a large lump sum investment requiring to mobilize huge amount of 
money in a short period of time while expected returns on investment would come 
progressively as the water subscriptions would increase. Conversely in Milan the chosen 
technical solution implied only to invest progressively relatively small amounts of money. 
Investments in water infrastructure could be implemented step by step as the number of 
subscriptions to the water service increased (Bigatti 2000, 222) .  
Last but not least the choice of relying on local groundwater resources was also a way for 
Milan’s municipality to be free from the central government’s authorization which would 
have been compulsory in case far away water had been chosen.  
3.3 Sanitation  
Sewers 
By 1868 although various canals and sewers22 existed already in Milan, they had been built 
randomly street by street with no systemic vision. The first sewer master plan for the city of 
Milan was approved that year and implemented very slowly over ten years with only 3.5 km 
realized by 1878.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
22
 There were 123 canals/sewers totalizing 153 km in 1868 (Gentile, Brown, and Spadoni 1990, 29) 
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Figure 2 : Milano city’s map in 1870 including surface water and the first sewer system 
 
Source : Poggi (Poggi 1911, 14) 
 
Figure 3 : Milan sewer system in 1896 (thick lines) including the planned sewers (light lines) 
 
Source : (Dorigati and Molon 1982, 191) 
 
The 1868 master plan designed a well thought sewer network within Milan historical centre. 
In those years however Milan’s size was constantly increasing due to a significant 
demographic growth (Table 1). In order to rule the urban expansion, in January 1886 a town 
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development masterplan (Piano regolatore Beruto) was approved by the city’s council (refer 
to § 2.3). A sanitation masterplan was needed too and in 1888 a specific sanitation office was 
created within the municipal technical department with the mission of designing a new sewer 
master plan for the city (Municipio di Milano 1890a).  
Such a masterplan was approved by the city’s council in 1890. It was conceived to  serve a 
2830 hectares area with a combined sewer network. The project was based on the 963 265 
inhabitants hypothesis made by the Piano regolatore Beruto and on a domestic water 
consumption23 of 100 l/person/day. The city was divided in 4 water collection areas. Three 
areas would discharge waste water respectively through three major sewers (Gentilino, 
Vigentino, Nosedo), all reaching the Roggia Vettabbia river while a fourth area would 
discharge water in the Lambro Meridionale river. Milan’s ground is naturally sloping from 
the North to the South. This a key condition which allows to build only free flow gravity 
sewers with no need of pumping stations for waste water. 
The masterplan included 355 km of small section sewers (called canali), 30 km of major 
sewer and 42 km of secondary sewers to be built or renovated. Most of the new sewers were 
planned in the inner annulus area between the Spanish walls and the city’s masterplan limit 
(area 3 between green dotted line and black full line circles in Figure 1), some of them in the  
intermediate annulus area (area 2) between the navigli (red finely dotted circle) and the 
Spanish walls circle (green dotted circle) and very few in the inner core area (area 1) internal 
to the the navigli (red finely dotted circle ) (Municipio di Milano 1891a). 
The 1890 sanitation masterplan costs were estimated by the city’s council in 14 million lira 
plus 300 000 lira per year for small section sewers (canali). In 1891 a municipal commission 
estimated in 8 886 000 lira24 the fraction of that plan to be implemented in the forthcoming 
ten years until 1901 (Municipio di Milano 1891a, 32). 
Waste water for land farming 
For various centuries waste water collected by the Milan’s canals (navigli) had been 
channelled by the Roggia Vettabbia and had irrigated large farming areas downstream of 
Milan (the so called marcite25). Such a process had been admired by various foreigners26. 
                                                 
 
23
 The domestic water consumption estimation did not include public building consumption. 
24
 That amount includes 240 000 lira per year allocated to small section sewers (canali). 
25
 There is a historical document (28 September 1583) giving the technical description of 15 irrigation intakes 
from the Roggia Vettabbia. A copy of the document is available in Gentile et al. (1990, 12) 
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While many European cities27 (including Paris : Crespi Reghizzi (2012)) met strong local 
opposition to waste water disposal through land farming, Milan was instead lucky enough to 
have a well-established tradition28 of such a practice. The 1890 sanitation project obviously 
planned to go ahead in the waste water disposal through land farming practice. The Roggia 
Vettabbia was supposed to collect in fine waste water from 2102 hectares of city areas and 
750 479 inhabitants. It was irrigating 2292 hectares of land. That gives a 330 
inhabitants/hectare irrigated ratio which was far less than what was practised elsewhere in 
Europe (Municipio di Milano 1890a, 66).  
4 Investments in Milan water and sanitation infrastructure 
(1888-1927) 
In the previous section we have described the 1890 sanitation and water supply project. In this 
section we will analyse the massive water and sanitation infrastructure which has been built in 
Milan according to those projects. Within nearly 40 years between 1888 and 1926, major 
water and sanitation infrastructure was built in Milan. Indeed by 1926 the water supply and 
sewer networks reached a length respectively of 531 and 509 km (Figure 4). Roughly 13 km 
of water supply and sewer network were laid down each year in those 40 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
26
 « Da parecchi secoli la città di Milano irriga le marcite colle acque di Vettabbia, la quale raccoglie i liquidi 
immondi della città. E’ dunque una applicazione delle irrigazioni coll’acqua di fogna, diluite, è vero, ma in dosi 
considerevoli, che sorpassano i cento mila metri cubi all’anno e all’ettaro . E’ inutile insistere sulle raccolte 
prodigiose di queste marcite, che sono l’ammirazione di tutti i visitatori. »(Mille 1885; quoted in Municipio di 
Milano 1890a). « Ho visitato le marcite di Milano irrigate dalla Vettabbia. Non vi è in verità fra I nostril prati e 
le marcite che la differenza fra il piccolo e il grande. Io sono stato convinto da questa visita dell’eccellenza del 
sistema anche applicato su vastissime estensioni » Lettera del prof Rollet, prof d’igiene alla Facoltà di Medicina 
di Lione al deputato Bourneville. quoted by (Municipio di Milano 1890a, 62).  
27
 The 1890 sanitation master plan makes various comparisons with other European cities (Bruxelles, Paris, 
Berlin, London). Information had been collected at the 1878 International hygiene congress in Wien (Municipio 
di Milano 1890a, 60). 
28
 « Il lavoro di secoli ha predisposto I terreni a valle della città in modo che già sono adatti a riceverne gli 
scoli… I proprietary dei terreni non solo accettano l’acqua ma la comprano e tanto più la pagano quanto essa è 
ricca di materie fertilizzanti.» (Poggi 1911, 327). Despite what Mr Poggi wrote, revenues from selling irrigation 
water do not appear relevant in the city’s financial report. 
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Figure 4 : Milan’s water supply and sewer networks length (1888-1927) 
 
Source : author’s elaboration, various data sources 
 
4.1 Water infrastructure 
Since clean underground water was available in large quantities below the city of Milan, only 
basic infrastructure was required to deliver it to the city’s inhabitants. First of all various wells 
were built starting with two experimental wells in 1888 and totalizing 331 wells in 1927. By 
1927, 17 pumping stations29 had been built, totalizing a nominal discharge capacity of 5.830 
l/s (Table 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
29
 In 1908 the first pumping station built in 1889 (Arena) was entirely modernized with electrical engines and 
renamed “Parco”. 
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Table 4 : Water pumping stations in operation by 1927 in Milan 
Pumping station name Construction year Nominal discharge [l/sec] Number of wells 
Rondo’ Cagnola 1898 170 12 
Parini 1900 100 10 
Loreto 1901 200 12 
Armi 1904 400 12 
Cenisio 1906 300 14 
Vercelli 1906 400 12 
Parco 1908 300 10 
Comasina 1909 400 14 
Maggiolina 1912 400 28 
Anfossi 1915 400 37 
Italia 1919 400 26 
Trotter 1920 360 22 
Este 1924 400 24 
Indipendenza 1925 400 26 
Crema 1926 400 25 
Palestro 1926 400 23 
Napoli 1927 400 24 
Total  5830 331 
Source : Motta (1989b) 
 
There was little need of storage units since the abundant acquifer is by itself a massive natural 
water storage just below the city. Only two relatively small reservoirs30 (1200 cubic meters 
each) were placed in 1889 and in 1896 inside two of the towers of the Milan’s castle (Castello 
Sforzesco) near by the first pumping station (Municipio di Milano 1907a, 28). Within the 
pumping stations in operation in 1906 there was a great variety of energy sources : gas, steam 
engine, electricity from the Edison power network and electricity from the municipal power 
network (Municipio di Milano 1905a, 32).  
4.2 Sanitation infrastructure 
Minor modifications to the 1890 Mr Poggi sanitation master plan were designed through an 
alternative plan in 1897. It was not easy to develop the sewer system as fast as the urban 
transformation which was taking place.  In 1901 and 1902 two study commissions (led by two 
Professors at the Politecnico di Milano Paladini and Fantoli) were charged by the 
municipality to evaluate the 1890 sanitation masterplan since some doubts had rose on the 
rightness of that plan. The two commissions confirmed the soundness of the initial plan. Thus, 
a new sanitation masterplan (Figure 5) designed by Mr Poggi was approved by the City’s 
                                                 
 
30
 The storage in the southern tower (torrione sud) was in reinforced concrete while the one in the eastern one 
was in iron. The two reservoirs exerted in fact a pression’s regulation mission rather than properly a storage one. 
The 1907 technical relation states : “both for hygienic and cost-efficient reasons there is no need to build a larger 
storage unit in Milan. It is far better to build a few spare pumping units.” (Municipio di Milano 1907a, 28, the 
author’s translation). 
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council in 1911 (Poggi 1911). It was focused on extending the sewer in the new areas where 
the city was expanding (Zona di ampliamento). The various sanitation master plans were not 
limited to the administrative area of Milan’s municipality31 and the sewer system was 
designed to collect waste water on a larger area32. Such a design did not imply however that 
the City of Milan would pay the sewer investments also for the outskirts municipalities33. Mr 
Poggi suggested that some agreements on the sewer’s usage could be signed with these 
municipalities if they were not absorbed by Milan’s municipality (Poggi 1911, 690). Mr 
Poggi proved to be right and predictive since in 1923 the annexation to Milan’s municipality 
of eleven municipalities34, previously independent took place. A new sanitation masterplan 
was then drafted by Mr Codara35 in 1924.  
Figure 5 : Milan sewer system in 1910 (thick lines) including the planned sewers (light lines) 
 
Source : (Dorigati and Molon 1982, 192) 
                                                 
 
31
 Meaning a total of 5400 hectares according to the 1889 city’s development plan and to the piano di 
ampliamento 
32
 The 1901 sanitation plan concerned 2884 hectares while the 1911 plan concerned 3501 hectares. This gives a 
total of 6385 hectares which covered all the area within the railway belt around Milan. 
33
 On June 15, 1917 an agreement was signed with the Greco municipality concerning the sanitation service (Atti 
del Municipio di Milano 1916-1917 quoted by Sai et al 1970, 261). Agreements with the other neighboring 
municipalities were signed too in the years afterwards.   
34
 Baggio, Trenno, Musocco, Affori, Niguarda, Greco, Gorla, Crescenzago, Lambrate, Chiaravalle, Vigentino 
35
 Such a new masterplan was implemented out of the timeframe of our study. A map of the Codara development 
masterplan is given in Appendix 3. 
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One could wonder why so many plans were necessary at such a high frequency. The reason is 
given by Mr Poggi himself (Poggi 1911, 7) : “the sewer infrastructure in the old part of a city 
can be organized and designed at once through a definitive masterplan. The question is 
different for our city which does not fit anymore within the 1889 city’s development plan. 
Furthermore, since in our city people did not comply that much to the 1889 development plan, 
as a fact sewer realization had to adapt to the city’s builders needs and trespassings”. Indeed it 
was not easy to develop and adapt the sewer system as fast as the urban transformation which 
was taking place (Gentile, Brown, and Spadoni 1990, 102). 
By the end of 1905 only 151 km of sewers had been completed and only 3950 building were 
connected to the sewers. Between 1888 and 1905 an average of 7,4 km of sewers per year had 
been built.  Such a slow rhythm of work appear to have various reasons. On one hand works 
were complexified by the fact that it was necessary to lower the water table before digging the 
sewers (Municipio di Milano 1907a). On the other hand there were still some doubts on some 
technicalities of the project and in 1898 a study commission was asked to study and give an 
advice. Last but not least the slow implementation was also due to the difficulty to find an 
agreement with the farmers irrigation consortium downstream of Milan (Consorzio Vettabbia) 
where Milan’s waste water was supposed to be discharged and used for irrigation. It was only 
in 1905 and 1906 that agreements were signed respectively with the Consorzio Vettabbia and 
the Consorzio Redefosso  
Indeed by 1906 the total discharge capacity of the major sewers (Gentilino; Vigentino, 
Nosedo and a few smaller ones) was still not large enough to channel all the water in case of 
large rains. The acquisition and planned improvements of the Redefosso canal (thanks to the 
1906 agreement with the Consorzio Redefosso) were supposed to help to increase the 
maximum discharge capacity of the whole sewer system (Municipio di Milano 1907a). 
After 1906 works sped up significantly as some figures at the end of 1910 show : 261 km of 
sewer and 6500 buildings connected. With Mr Poggi’s 1911 new masterplan, the sewers were 
extended even more in the city’s outskirts reaching the impressive length of 509 km in 1927 
with 13 760 buildings connected, representing roughly 77 % of Milan’s houses according to 
Bigatti (1997, 223). 
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4.3 Investments amounts  
According to the annual city financial report (conto consuntivo) capital expenditure in water 
and sanitation infrastructure add up to a total amount of respectively 79.9 and 227.2 million 
Italian lira (expressed in 1924 value). It appears indeed that sanitation infrastructure implied 
costs nearly three times greater than water supply ones. As a fact the average annual capital 
expenditure in water and sanitation in those years was respectively of 2.1 and 6.1 million 
Italian lira (expressed in 1924 value). 
Figure 6 : Cumulative capex in water and sanitation (1888-1924), thousand Lira 1924 value 
 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Conto consuntivo dell’anno… 
 
Figure 7 : Yearly CAPEX in water and sanitation (1888-1924), thousand Lira 1924 
value
Source : author’s elaboration based on Conto consuntivo dell’anno… 
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When observing yearly total capex on the above graph a major investment peak phase appears 
from 1905 to WWI. Significant investments in the sewer network were undertaken not only 
for hygiene reasons but also to fight underemployment (Sai et al. 1970, 261). During the war 
investments’ nearly stopped. Public works started up again after the war in 1919 and 1920 
(Sai et al. 1970, 227). 
An interesting document written to get a loan in 1907 (Municipio di Milano 1907a) 
summarizes the undertaken investments in water and sanitation. Focusing on water 
investments, by 1906 6,7 million lira (nominal value) had been spent. 57 % of the expenses 
had gone into the distribution network and 33 % on the wells and pumping stations while less 
than 0,5% had gone into the storage units (Table 5). 
Table 5 : Total investments in water infrastructure by 1906 
 
Arena Cagnola 
Parini 
and 
bastioni 
Venezia 
Loreto Piazza d’Armi Cenisio 
Corso 
Vercelli 
total 
pumping 
stations 
Storage 
eastern 
tower 
Storage 
southern 
tower 
Tot 
storage Network 
Various 
expenses Total 
Cost 
[kLira] 253 284 185 330 478 410 330 2 270 158 162 320 3 880 290 6 760 
% 
       
33,6 
  
4,7 57,4 4,3 
 
Source : author’s elaboration based on (Municipio di Milano 1907a), all values in thousand Lira 
 
The water and sanitation capital expenditures in 1906 (expressed in 1926 lira) represent 
roughly 38 % of the total invested amounts in 1924 showing than the infrastructure expansion 
phase was far from being completed. Indeed the data in §9.4 confirm that the networks’ 
expansion was still in progress after WWII. 
4.4 Water and sanitation infrastructure in the context of urban 
transformation 
It is key to underline that the expansion of water supply and sewer networks took place in 
Milan in a phase of massive urban expansion and transformation ruled, at least partially, by 
the various city’s development masterplans (§2.3). The city’s urban expansion not only 
imposed the networks’ topography but also their expansion rhythm. 
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Indeed a municipal report of April 189036 argues that a 2,7 M lira amount is urgently needed 
for water and sanitation investments since “they are essential to the street works already 
approved and under implementation in 1890-1891”37.  
One year later another report (Municipio di Milano 1891a, 26)  is even more explicit and 
states that “the realization of the sewers cannot be postponed since it was started and should 
be implemented jointly with the City’s development masterplan. Indeed sewers are part of the 
masterplan since drainage is essential for both the new streets and buildings38”.It also adds 
that “the priority in extending the water supply network is given to the streets having a sewer 
or to those where a sewer is planned shortly. However to extend the water network in every 
street where a sewer exist would be too much. Thus, the priority is given to the streets where 
at least a single subscription to the water service can be forecasted in the first year.”39   
Not only water and sanitation infrastructure has a tight inter relation with the Piano 
regolatore’s development on a technical base but it might also be worthwhile to compare their 
relative investment amounts. At first, expenses dedicated to refurbished streets and areas 
according to the piano regolatore where much higher than water and sanitation capital 
expenditures but after 1893-1894 this not true anymore and water and sanitation expenditures 
(particularly the latter) get higher than the piano regolatore ones as the two graphs below 
show.  Indeed total sanitation capital expenditures over the 15 years of available data (1897, 
1898 and 1899 data are missing) inflated to 1924 Italian Lira (112 million Lira) are by 
themselves nearly as high as the ones due to the Piano Regolatore (138 million). If we add up 
water capital expenditures (43 million Lira) to sanitation ones , their total amount (156 million 
Lira) is greater than what has been spent on the Piano regolatore’s implementation40 (full 
details and figures are given in Appendix 1). That confirms that water and sanitation 
infrastructure represent the essential investment to be undertaken in an urban transformation. 
                                                 
 
36
 That document was written to justify the subscription of a 8 M lira mutuo ipotecario with the Cassa di 
Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde   
37
 « Sono richiesti dalle opere di viabilità già deliberate ed iniziate pel biennio 1890-1891” (Municipio di 
Milano 1890b, 9) 
38
 “L’opera stessa è stata iniziata ed è destinata a svolgersi parallelamente al piano regolatore, del quale è 
necessario e connesso organism, dovendosi alle nuove costruzioni e alle nuove vie designare i convenienti 
provvedimenti di scolo.”  
39
 « Si prediligono le vie dove c’è la fognatura o dove ha da essere eseguita. Pero estendere acqua ovunque ci 
sia la fognatura sarebbe eccessivo, allora si prediligono le vie dove ci dovrebbe essere una richiesta nell’anno.” 
40
 This comparison might be biased however by accounting and contracting practices.Were both the road and 
watsan works undertaken by a single entrepreneur or by different ones ? Were they paid by a single municipal 
department or billed pro-rata to the watsan department on one hand and to department in charge of the piano 
regolatore on the other hand ? How were these amounts accounted for in the yearly financial report ?  
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Figure 8 : Water & sanitation Vs urban transformation capital expenditures 
 
Source : author’s elaboration, Million Lira, nominal value 
 
Figure 9 : Water & sanitation Vs urban transformation capital expenditures 
 
Source : author’s elaboration, Million Lira, inflated to 1924 value41 
 
5 Municipal finance (1861-1930) 
5.1 Fiscal regime in Italy (1861-1930) 
The financial organization of the newly born Italian state was progressively set between 1861 
and 1876. The imposta di ricchezza mobile (income tax on all revenues except property ones) 
                                                 
 
41
 using ISTAT serie storiche – Tavola 21.6.1 
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which was previously in place in the Regno di Sardegna was extended to all of Italy (legge 
1840 del 14 luglio 1864). It was a non-progressive income tax on all incomes except those 
deriving from properties which were taxed through the imposta sui terreni (land property tax) 
and imposta sui fabbricati (buildings property tax) (legge n°2136 del 26 gennaio 1865). 
The Italian state was heavily centralized and municipalities (comuni) were under the tight 
control of the prefetto42 (prefect) who was both the govenrment’s representative and the head 
of the provincia’s administration43(Cassar and Creaco 2007, 713–715). Intergovernmental 
relations were designed in a centralized way through various acts, particularly the 1859 
Rattazzi decree (Regio Decreto 23 Ottobre 1859 n°3702) and the 1865 law (Legge n° 2248 20 
Marzo 1865). According to those acts, municipal expenses were classified in compulsory 
(spese obbligatorie) and optional ones (spese facoltative). The municipalities could undertake 
optional expenses only once they had covered all the compulsory ones. However the 
distinction between the two categories was quite arbitrary and among the compulsory 
expenses44 there were some expenses which by definition should be under the central 
government’s responsibility: primary education, national defense, elections costs, prisons45. 
Furthermore, the fact that the optional expenses (such as public works and infrastructure) 
were disincentivized was by itself a problem.   
Municipal revenues were authorized to come from various sources: i) non fiscal sources (such 
as tariff revenues from municipal services including water and sanitation), ii) autonomous 
taxes and iii) additional levy on national taxes (the so called sovraimposta). No recurrent 
transfers from the central government were in place (except minor ones). 
The dazio di consumo (excise duty) was the major fiscal revenue. However a ceiling on the 
dazio di consumo was fixed by the 1865 law in order to avoid excessive taxation on low 
income people (Cassar and Creaco 2007, 716). Excise duty was both a central and local tax. 
Municipalities were authorized to tax additional duties on goods already taxed by the central 
state excise duty and were authorized to create autonomous excise duties only on goods with a 
                                                 
 
42
 The mayor were formally appointed by the king. The prefect had the power to revoke the mayors.     
43
 The provincial (the county) is an administrative area larger than the municipality and smaller than the regione 
which was created after WWII.  
44
 Maintenance of water supply systems and of streets were among the compulsory expenses 
http://digilander.libero.it/nabob/Storia/T13.HTML while all new investments (capital expenditures) were 
considered as optional expenses. 
45
 “istruzione elementare per i due sessi, guardia nazionale, registri dello stato civile, elezioni, sala d’arresto 
presso la giudicatura del mandamento e per la custodia del mandamento”. Art 116 legge 20 marzo 1865 n° 
2248 quoted by (Volpi 1959) 
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minor fiscal yield (Volpi 1959, 16).  Progressively municipalities share on the excise duties 
revenues was increased as the other fiscal incomes were reduced46. However excise duty 
revenues were fully given to municipalities only in 1923 (Volpi 1959, 20)  
If total revenues coming both from non fiscal sources and autonomous fiscal revenues were 
not sufficient to cover the compulsory expenses, municipalities could ask to be authorized by 
the central power to impose additional levies on national taxes (income tax, land property tax 
and building property tax). The additional levies had to weight similarly on the three taxes 
(Cassar and Creaco 2007, 716). In other words both “a standard minimum tax rate and 
maximum tax rates were defined. Standard minimum rates were planned to cover 
“compulsory” expenses in all local governments, but a proviso was set to entitle (and force) 
local governments to adjust tax rates in order to pay for the execution of compulsory 
spending” (Giarda 2005). 
The table below shows the majors sources of fiscal revenues for Italian municipalities. 
Although the ratio of autonomous fiscal revenues over total municipal fiscal revenues doubles 
from 11.4 % in 1871 to 22.5 % in 1912, non-autonomous fiscal revenues are still largely 
dominant (88.6% in 1871 and 77.5% in 1912). Excise duties and additional levies on national 
taxes contribute both significantly to the latter (excise-duties are predominant however). 
Table 6 : Total fiscal revenues of Italian municipalities 
 Additional levies Excise duty Autonomous fiscal 
revenues 
Total 
 Million Lira 
nominal value 
% Million 
Lira 
nominal 
value  
% Million Lira 
nominal value 
% Million 
Lira 
nominal 
value 
1871 79 46.5 71 42.1 19 11.4 169 
1886 119 42.5 123 43.6 39 13.9 281 
1899 134 39.2 159 46.4 49 14.4 342 
1912 194 38.1 201 39.4 115 22.5 510 
Source : Volpi (1959, 20)  
 
The fiscal regime of municipalities had some weak points which progressively (especially 
after 1870)  put the municipalities in an uneasy financial situation. A first weakness came 
                                                 
 
46
 Furthermore a municipality could chose to collect not only its own share of the excise duty but also the central 
government share on its behalf. In that case the municipality would guarantee a fixed revenue (canone daziario) 
to the central government. The amount of such canone daziario was judged too high by many municipalities and 
special laws were passed to delay its payment in various instalments (Volpi 1959, 20). At the end of the 19th 
century the  canone daziario amount was frozen and stayed untouched for many years meaning that the central 
government share on the excise duties was falling down steadily leaving most of it to the municipalities 
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from the fact that the central state and the municipalities were sharing the same fiscal 
revenues. Thus, a significant fiscal competition took place between the two levels of the state. 
On one hand even if the legislator had thought of the sovraimposte as last resort source of 
revenue, municipalities considered sovraimposte as an ordinary fiscal source (Fraschini 1991, 
26). Indeed, they  always preferred to increase sovraimposte rather than setting autonomous 
taxes since sovraimpposte were less visible and more easily hinded behind the central state 
mask (Locatelli 2010, 13; Cassar and Creaco 2007, 717).  On the other hand the central state, 
which was facing a tight financial situation too, progressively limited the municipalities’ 
fiscal autonomy. Indeed, in 187047 additional taxes on business income (sovrimposta di 
richezza mobile) were abolished48, restraining municipalities’ additional tax base to properties 
taxes (Marongiu 2001, 19). In 188649 municipalities additional taxes on properties were 
limited too at the average level of the previous years. Conversely the municipalities were 
authorized to collect minor autonomous taxes50 which were however absolutely not levying 
the same amount of money previously collected by the abolished ones. 
In 189451 optional expenses were disicentivized even more : a municipality could create an 
additional tax on property tax only if all optional expenses had been canceled. As a fact 
national public works expenses decreased steeply from 147 Million Lira in 1889 to 77 Million 
Lira in 1899 (Volpi 1959, 19). 
Not only municipalities’ fiscality was reduced but also the list of compulsory expenses of the 
municipalities was progressively extended as stated by Luigi Einaudi “The central state kept 
confiscating municipal revenues while it transferred new expenses to municipalities”52. Only 
                                                 
 
47
 Legge 11 agosto 1870 n°5784 (Volpi 1959, 17) 
48
 In1874 (Legge 14 giugno 1874 n°1961) the additional levy on building tax (15 centesimi addizionali di 
sovraimmposta sui fabbricati), which was previously a revenue of the provincie, was rerouted to the central’state 
budget too. 
49
 Legge 1 marzo 1886 n° 3682 quoted by (Volpi 1959, 17) 
50
 e.g :  imposta sul valore locativo (proportional tax on the cadastral rent of housing), tassa di famiglia (local 
progressive income tax), tassa sul bestiame (tax on livestock), imposta di esercizio o di rivendita (licenses on 
commercial activities), imposta sulel vetture (levy on cars) o sui domestici (levy on domestics servants). (Cassar 
and Creaco 2007, 717).  
51
 legge 22 luglio 1894 n°339 (provvedimenti Sonnino) 
52
 Lo Stato di fronte ai comuni non ha Saputo far altro che togliere entrate da una parte e rovesciare su di esse 
nuove spese generali e non locali ; L. Einaudi, Pronunciamento dei comuni in Cronache, 1905, II volume,  p 
203,  quoted by Cassar and Creaco (2007) 
  
29
minor modifications to the municipalities’ fiscal regime were approved in 1898, 1908 and 
191553 while various major fiscal reform projects turned up not being approved. 
Thus, in 1912 the fiscal regime of municipalities was very similar to the 1865 one. As a 
matter of facts, fiscal sources represented 66,58 %  of municipal revenues in 1912 versus 
65,90 %   in 1866 (Cassar and Creaco 2007). Moreover, municipal fiscal revenues were still 
mainly coming from the excise duties and the additional tax on properties54 while other taxes 
such as the imposta sul valore locativo (introduced in1866),or the imposta di famiglia 
(introduced in 1868) had minor relevance. Nevertheless the relative weigth of excise-duties on 
municipal revenues had decreased from 46 (in 1899) to 39 % (in 1912) as the Table 6 shows. 
During WWI the municipal fiscal regime proved to have a very poor fiscal elasticity and tax 
rate had to be increased various times to give some fresh air to municipalities’ financial 
distress. However these tax rate increases were not so effective since they were made in a 
context of heavy inflation which modified constantly the tax base (Locatelli 2010, 19). After 
the war, various attempts were made to launch a fiscal reform but no changes took place until 
1931 and 1934 when the Testo Unico della finanza locale and the Testo Unico della legge 
comunale e provinciale were respectively approved55. According to those acts various 
compulsory expenses (such as the primary school personnel salaries, the polling stations or 
the prisons) were transferred from the municipalities to the central state. On the fiscal side of 
the equation, although some autonomous municipal taxes56 were authorized, no major change 
took place as the essential fiscal revenues for municipalities still came from excise-duties and 
sovrimposte57. 
When comparing intergovernmental relations in Italy over the 80 years between 1861 and 
1941 with more recent decades a major feature of those early years appears: at that time 
transfers between the central state and the municipalities were not taking place and own tax 
revenues to total spending ratio was very high (including both autonomous and non-
                                                 
 
53
 Regio decreto  4 maggio 1898  n° 164,  Regio decreto 4 febbraio 1908  n° 269, Regio decreto  4 febbraio 1915  
n° 148 
54
 The excise duties and the additional tax on properties represented 79 % of municipal fiscal revenues in 1912, 
69 % in 1928 and 72,7 % in 1935 (Locatelli 2010). 
55
 Regio decreto 14 settembre 1931 n°1175 and Regio decreto 3 marzo 1934 n°383 
56
 The imposta sul valore locativo (proportional tax on the cadastral rent of housing) was supposed to be the 
major autonomous tax source. Municipalities with less than 30 000 inhabitants could choose adopt the imposta di 
famiglia (local progressive income tax) instead of the imposta sul valore locative (Marongiu 2001, 268). Most of 
the municipalities chose to adopt the imposta di famiglia which was able to give larger revenues (Locatelli 2010, 
31). 
57
 Refer to the figures given in one of the previous footnotes. 
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autonomous tax revenues). Indeed, according to Marongiu “before WWI fiscal 
decentralization was much more significant than in all the rest of the 20th century”58. 
Surprisingly, no equalizing mechanism was in place in a newly born country which had major 
geographical variability between the North and the South (Giarda 2005) implying that low 
revenues municipalities were not always able to deliver public services (Fraschini 1991, 27). 
As progressively the responsibility of more public services was given to the municipalities 
(thus increasing compulsory expenses) while their fiscal autonomy was reduced, the average 
income to expenses ratio progressively fell down from more than 100 % in 1866-1868 to 94 
% in 1899, 89% in 1907 and 79,81 % in 1912 (Cassar and Creaco 2007, 721). Nevertheless, 
municipal budgets had to be closed in balance (including the debt service) and the solution 
often came from loans as we shall see in section 6. 
5.2 Taxing (or not taxing) land added value  
In those years Italian municipalities were largely investing in basic urban infrastructure. 
Those investment had the effect of significantly increasing added value of the properties near 
by. According to nowadays value capture theory, urban infrastructure can be financed 
endogenously if the local authorities are able to design proper legal mechanisms to capture the 
added value created by urban growth. In other terms through a value capture financing 
scheme a public administration can monetize a part of the positive externalities of an 
infrastructure project (Brugnoli 2010, 15). There is a large variety of tools which can allow to 
do this as the table below shows. This paragraph is focused on the mandatory tools and 
particularly on the betterment levies in Italy while paragraph 5.3 is focused on other tools and 
policies implemented (or not implemented) in Milan.  
According to Peterson(2009) a distinction has to be made between bettement levies stricto 
sensu which raise a lump-sum tax among property owners in the neighborood of an 
infrastructure and a general tax on land value gains which is paid on broader base by property 
owners and which is less tightly connected to a specific infrastructure. « Betterment levies 
have been caught in a dilemma. It has proved too ambitious in practice to try to identify with 
precision, parcel by parcel, the land-value gains resulting from public works 
projects….Practical measures have relaxed the strict interpretation of “value capture” and 
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 « Prima della prima guerra si ebbe un decentramento delle entrate quale dopo non si ebbe per tutto il resto del 
‘900 » (Marongiu 1999, 9–15; quoted by Locatelli 2010, 18) 
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turned the betterment levy into a general infrastructure tax, more broadly tied to land-value 
gains.” 
Table 7 : Value capture financing tools 
Capture from (Who is 
the payer?) 
Voluntary tools Mandatory tools Comments 
Developers Joint development -Development exaction and 
impact fees 
- Public land acquisitions 
and resale  
Expansion areas / 
integrated urban 
renovation operation 
The community59 No -Betterment levies  
-General infrastructure tax 
on land value gains 
Built up areas 
Within  Internalization (integrated 
urban developer) 
No  
Source : author’s elaboration based on concepts from various sources (ReUrba 2006; Peterson 2009; Brugnoli 
2010) 
 
In the second half of the 19th century various countries (England, USA, Prussia) were taxing 
property value increases in order to finance investments in urban infrastructure60. In England, 
according to the 1895 Victoria act, municipalities could impose a “betterment-tax” on all side-
resident if their property had received a value increase thanks to the realization of a public 
infrastructure. The yearly betterment-tax amount was computed as follows : 3% on the half of 
the property value’s increase61. Similarly in the USA “special assessments” were used by 
various cities (Boston for example between 1866 and 1870) to finance their urban 
infrastructure expansion. In Prussia too in 1875 and 1893 two laws62 made provision for the 
infrastructures burden to be covered by side-residents.    
In Italy the principle that  “those who had some earnings from an infrastructure should give a 
contribution to the betterment costs” had been included in the June 25th 1865 law on 
expropriation for public utility (Marongiu 2001, 86). Other laws approved in those years for 
specific urban transformation were based on such principle. However the 1865 law required 
very specific conditions to be applied. Conversely to the English, Prussian and American 
cases, in Italy a law allowing to systematically capture a share of property value increase did 
not exist and was not approved in the 19th century.  
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 “The community consists of all property owners in the direct vicinity of the infrastructure (direct 
beneficiaries)”(ReUrba 2006)  
60
 Most of the following informations are taken from Marongiu (2001, 83–87). 
61
 deducing from the betterment-tax all other taxes eventually weighting on such a property value’s increase 
62
 Law July 2nd 1875 and Lax July 14th 1893. According to the 1893 law betterment taxes were included among 
the ordinary municipal fiscal revenues. 
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It is interesting to point out that excise-duties on raw materials for the building industry can 
be considered an alternative way of taxing the property rent. In Milan prior to 1897 such a 
duty was due only in the city’s area internal to the Spanish walls and was estimated around 
8% of the construction costs which is still much less than the property added value. Such a 
fiscal disparity incentivized building in the outward area.(Dorigati and Molon 1982, 183)     
In 1904 however a tax on building land areas is approved in Italy63. According to that law 1 % 
of the land value increase was to be paid by the owner. In order to encourage truth declaring 
in 190764 it was established that, if an expropriation  was needed, the expropriation amount to 
be paid by the municipality to the land owner would be the same property value amount 
declared by the owner (Marongiu 2001, 161–165). The 1904 law was designed however to 
incentivize building rather than capturing a share of property value increase65. Indeed the idea 
of allowing local authorities to control land rent was still not present (Dorigati and Molon 
1982, 184). Obviously the approval of the tax on building area and its application  met a 
strong opposition by land owners and the tax was more effective in creating a harsh political 
debate than in giving more funding to municipalities (Marongiu 2001, 165). Indeed in Milan 
it was estimated that the tax could collect a total amount of only 341 709 lira (1% of a tax 
base of 34 M lira) which appears not relevant at all if compared with the total fiscal revenue 
of the Milan municipality at that time66.  
Indeed in 1914, Milan’s municipal administration was still asking for a legislative act 
allowing to capture property value increase caused by municipal infrastructure since the tax 
on building areas was not judged sufficient to capture the land value increase (Sai et al. 1970, 
229–230).  
Not only Italy did not manage to design a proper tax to collect a share of property value 
increase but also the property tax67 provided for by the 1865 law was collected not rigorously 
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 Tassa comunale sulle aree fabbricabili, approved by the July 8th 1904 Law n°320 
64
 Legge 11 luglio 1907 n°52 
65
 Such a tax was initially conceived for the Rome municipality but then extended to all municipalities who 
needed to incentivize to build houses. It was to be paid until a building had been completed on the area. 
“…imporre una tassa sulle aree fabbricabili, la quale anzichè avere uno scopo fiscal, tendesse essenzialmente a 
stimolare i proprietary di aree fabbricabili a costruire sulle medesime nell’interesse di quell maggior sviluppo 
edilizio, che era vivamente reclamato dalle condizioni della città.”(Municipio di Milano 1907a). 
66
 1905 rough values : 23.8 M Lira of total fiscal revenues composed mainly of 13.4 M Lira from the excise 
duty, 5.8 M Lira from the additional tax on property and 1.2 M Lira from the Tassa di esercizio e rivendita dei 
generi non riservati al monopolio dello Stato and 1.2 M Lira from the imposta sul valore locativo delle abitazioni 
(Atti del Municipio di Milano 1906-1907) 
67
 Including the additional tax (sovraimposta comunale) on property.   
  
33
since the tax base (property values) was not kept up to date (Dorigati and Molon 1982, 263). 
Indeed a general property value review was realized only in 1870 and 1890 while partial 
property value reviews implemented after 1910 (according to the 1865 law) were not 
sufficient to modify the tax base (Sai et al. 1970, 229–230).  
As a matter of facts, Italy was not able to implement effectively a tax system allowing to 
capture land value neither through betterment levies neither through a general tax on property 
values increase.   
5.3 Value capture policy in Milan 
During the 40 years we are analyzing massive urban expansion took place in Milan. In the 
framework of various city’s development master plans (§ 2.3) large investments were 
undertaken by the municipality to build basic infrastructure including water and sanitation.  
Land owners earned large profits since the value of their properties increased due to the 
infrastructure built and to the city’s development process.  
In the previous paragraph we have showed that tax tools were unable in Italy to capture a 
share of property value increase created by built infrastructure. We also mentioned that many 
other value capture tools exist. One of them which has been ambitiously implemented in Paris 
for example consist in a municipal policy of land acquisitions and resale. To what extent was 
such a value capture tool implemented in Milan ? This paragraph is focused on such a 
question. 
Prior and in parallel with the Beruto masterplan a large urban transformation operation was 
undertaken in areas next to the castle (Foro Buonaparte – Castello - Arena – Arco della Pace) 
when the decision of moving the Piazza d’Armi68 was taken. Through such an operation the 
municipality obtained the castle and the old Piazza d’Armi from the central state, in turn it had 
to give the new Piazza d’armi area to the State plus a 3 million lira grant to contribute to the 
barracks’ construction. At first land market prices in the two areas were very different : 8 lira 
/m2 in the castle area Vs 2.70 Lira/m2 in the new Piazza d’armi area. In addition to the area 
given by the state, the municipality also obtained from the Società Fondiaria some land to 
build new streets and urban services. The 182 000 m2 of area for construction were entirely 
sold to the banker Marsaglia in 1886 for 11 million lira (60 lira/m2) (de Finetti, 352). The 
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 This is the same area on which a corruption scandal with mayor Bellinzaghi arose in 1884 as we have 
mentioned in §2.3. The urban operation was implemented in the end after Bellinzaghi quitted. We do not know 
whether bribery took place on the final deal or not.  
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whole operation was profitable and gave an interesting additional extraordinary revenue to the 
municipal budget. Unfortunately we will see that such an operation was quite an exception. 
The city could have invested profits made in such an operation to buy at low prices land in the 
peripheric areas of the city which could have been sold afterwards at higher market prices 
fueling a revolving mechanism (de Finetti, 352). On the contrary the Beruto city’s 
development masterplan did not adopt such a policy. 
A municipal policy of land acquisitions and resale policy consists in owning or “acquiring 
lands near by an infrastructure project and then sell it on completion of the project” (Peterson 
2009, 41). A key issue in implementing such a policy is the expropriation power hold by the 
municipal authorities. Expropriation policies can be classified in three categories: i) 
expropriations are limited to the new streets, ii) expropriations are undertaken not only for 
street areas but also to build collective areas (such as schools, public gardens...) and iii) 
expropriations are authorized to a very large extent in order to finance urbanization costs 
through the selling of land or buildings at higher market value once the urban infrastructure 
are realized. 
According to Campos Venuti (1986, 12) the first version of the Beruto masterplan was clearly 
fitting in the second policy category. It planned a street network widely meshed with large 
size blocks while its second version planned a much more dense mesh with smaller size 
blocks much more favourable to real estate speculation. The first version of the Beruto 
masterplan was the “representation of the ambitious European ideas of the new industrial 
bourgeoisie. Those ambitions were however rapidly dismissed since Milan’s capitalists 
understood that they would have to pay by themselves such an ambitious plan” (Campos 
Venuti 1986, 16). The second version with much smaller blocks was then clearly less 
constraining for the land-owner bourgeoisie as Beruto himself states : “small blocks are due 
to the real estate speculation’s interests69”. Through the implementation of the second version 
of the Beruto masterplan Milan’s municipality is assuming the role of promoter of private 
investments. The city is absorbing all the infrastructure costs without managing to involve the 
private operators in the financing process (Boriani 1982, 59). Such a specific role sharing 
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 « gli isolati piccoli sono il prodotto della speculazione » (Beruto 1885, 6) 
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between the local authorities and the private partners is what Leonardo Benevolo defines the 
“neo-conservative” city70.  
Until the first years of the 20th century value capture policies were not largely implemented 
also due to the weakavailable legislative tools on expropriation (1865 Pisanelli law on 
expropriations and 15 gennaio 1885 Law on Naples urban renewal).  In 190771 the city of 
Rome is given the right to expropriate land owners more easily in order to capture land value. 
More powerful expropriation tools (allowing to expropriate to build social housing) were 
given to the City of Milan only with the approval of the Piano di ampliamento in 1912. 
In those years the debate on land value capture was rich also within Milan city council which 
was discussing the expansion masterplan (piano di ampliamento). The opposition asked the 
majority to obtain an expropriation law similar to the one obtained by the city of Rome in 
order to make the landowners contributing to the financing of the city’s infrastructure 
(Dorigati and Molon 1982, 185).  
Withouth waiting for the 1912 legislative expropriation tools a timid value capture policy 
based on land acquisition of larger areas surrounding the new streets is undertaken in 8 
districts developed between 1905 and 1912 in the framework of “integrated urban operation 
of housing and collective services”(Boriani 1982, 83). The policy adopted by mayor Cesare 
Ponti and proposed by engineer Cesare Saldini consisted in buying large expansion areas of 
the city which should have given a revolving72 set of land assets to the city (de Finetti, 343).  
Indeed the yearly relation on the 1906 municipal budget previsions shows that value capture 
policies where somehow put in place by Milan’s authorities : 1 360 000 m2 have been 
acquired by Milan’s municipality for a total amount of 4,5 million lira. 3 more millions will 
be needed to build 400 000  m2 of streets and to install tramways, water and sanitation. At the 
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 “…sta infatti in un compromesso fra amministrazione pubblica e proprietà immobiliare. L’amministrazione 
rinuncia a controllare l’insieme della città e garantisce il libero godimento privato dei lotti fabbricabili, che 
formano la maggior parte dell’area urbana, riservandosi una parte minore, cioè lo spazio indispensabile per la 
rete delle strade e degli impianti che devono disimpegnare e servire – quindi rendere utilizzabili – i lotti privati. 
La proprietà a sua volta riconosce l’intervento dell’amministrazione nei limiti precedenti, e trattiene – sotto 
forma di valore aggiunto al terreno o all’edificio – tutto o quasi tutto il vantaggio economico dell’operazione, 
caricando i costi – che diventano spese a fondo perduto – sull’ente pubblico, cioè sul resto dell’ente sociale”  
(Benevolo 1976) 
71
 Legge 11 luglio 1907 n°502 
72
 In fact the revolving conception such a policy was not implemented since a significant fraction of the land 
acquired in 1905 was awarded by the municipality to the Istituto autonomo per le Case  Popolari during the First 
Word War years. No other significant land buying were undertaken by the municipality afterwards except during 
the 1924-1929 years (de Finetti, 343). Too little areas were bought by the municipality to get a significative 
market power on the rythms and prices of the urban expansion (de Finetti, 344,352).  
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end the municipality will have spent 7,5 million lira in front of roughly 1 million m2 of net 
building area which the city will be able to sell back to a much higher value73.  
Such a land acquisition policy was judged not sufficient by the opposition as the discussion of 
the 1907 70 million lira loan with the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti shows. Mr Bottini 
(representing the opposition) argues that “the city’s government (Giunta) is planning too little 
land acquisitions to obtain significative added value74”. The council member Morpurgo 
replies that a more ambitious land acquisition policy allowing to capture land added value at a 
larger extent would imply to subscribe a much larger loan which is not possible since the 
revenues from the additional tax (sovrimposta) are not high enough.  
Such a debate points out that additionally to the availability of powerful expropriation 
legislative tools, the capacity to mobilizing quickly large amounts of money is another key 
condition needed to implement ambitious land value capture policies. In Paris appropriate 
expropriation tools were given to the municipality which in turn issued massive debt to 
finance an urban transformation based on very large land expropriation (Crespi Reghizzi 
2012). Conversely in Milan’s both these two essential conditions were not met : available 
expropriation tools were weak and the borrowing policy was very cautious and constrained. 
Indeed, as a matter of facts only two major urban value capture operations were undertaken in 
1885 (Foro Buonaparte area) and in 1905 (Saldini – Ponti policy).  With the exception of 
these two urban operations value capture mechanisms did not play a significant role in 
financing Milan’s urban infrastructure including the water and sanitation one. 
5.4 Milan’s municipality : financial constraints  
In the second half of the 19th century Milan’s municipality was facing tight financial 
constraints for various reasons. Firstly it was affected by the general framework of Italian 
municipal finance (described in § 5.1) : on one hand its fiscal autonomy was progressively 
reduced by national laws, on the other hand the list of municipal compulsory expenses was 
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 “Già a quest’ora sono assicurati al comune 1360 000 mq di aree che costarono, tutte insieme circa 4 millioni 
e mezzo ; vi si dovranno sistemare a strade circa 400 000 mq; vi si dovranno ativare I pubblici servizi di 
fognatura, illuminazione, acqua potabile; si dovrà dar loro vita con un pronto allacciamento alla rete tranviaria 
e tutto cio’ richiederà una spesa che si preventive in circa 3 millioni; sono quindi 7,5 millioni all’incirca che si 
dovranno spendere nel quinquennio, riccorrendo a fondi straordinari, per assicuare al Comune una superficie 
netta fabbricabile di circa un milione di mq. Non v’ha dubbio che, a sistemazione fatta, il valore di quell’area 
supererà di gran lunga le spese hce il Comune avrà anticipato ».(Municipio di Milano 1905b, 32) 
74
 « Cosi’ la Giunta propone l’acquisto di aree ma in misura troppo limitata per fornire largamente del plus 
valore e senza un concetto direttivo» (Atti del Municipio di Milano 1906-1907, seduta ordinaria del 19 luglio 
1907, p 572) 
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growing. A second reason of concern was the bull urban and demographic growth which 
required huge municipal investments to roll up a modern infrastructure. 
After Italy’s unification, as usual for Italian municipalities at that time, the excise duties were 
the municipality’s main source of revenues (Sai et al. 1970, 26). At that time Milan’s 
municipality ruled only a small area (§ 2.2). This was a major problem since due to fiscal 
opportunism, manufacturing activities were settling in the I Corpi Santi area  in order not to 
be subjected to the excise duty75.  Although the city’s administrative area grew significantly in 
1873 with the annexation of I Corpi Santi (§ 2.2), at first things did not change very much 
from a fiscal point of view since the annexated areas were exhonerated from the excise-duty. I 
Corpi Santi were subjected only to the Imposta sulla minuta vendita and as a fact each 
inhabitant was subjected to less than a third of tax than an inhabitant of the inner area (Volpi 
1959, 23) 
In the years afterwards a recurrent debate take place within the city’s council concerning the 
extension to all the city of the excise-duty regime76. On one hand such a fiscal inequality was 
giving strong incentives to an umbalanced territorial development in favour of the external 
part of the city77 and reduced significantly the city’s fiscal revenues. On the other hand 
inhabitants and stake holders of the annexhated areas were fiercely opposed to any 
modification of their excise-duty’s exemption regime78. 
Indeed, in the 1880’s the financial situation of Milan’s municipality is catastrophic (Sai et al. 
1970, 44) and various attempts of a fiscal reform are made. Such a process will take many 
years and in  1895 a municipal commission79 proposed80 to abolish the physical excise-duty 
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 “si tratta di un dazio che bandisce dalla città nostra le industrie, spingendole oltre le mura, vessatorio su mille 
modi, immorale nelle conseguenze del contrabbando” Mussi at the city’s council in 1872.quoted by (Sai et al. 
1970, 32).  
76
 «  Milano ha un difetto originario di costruzione : di essere divisa in due parti di cui una paga meno 
dell’altra…il nostro debito è maggiore di ogni città italiana esclusa Napoli” from the city’s council debate 1885 
quoted by. (Sai et al. 1970, 46)   
77
 This could also be seen as positive since the economic activities were incentivized to go outside of the city 
centre. (Volpi 1959) 
78
 For many years the annexation itself had been strongly opposed. When it was signed, the annexhation decrees 
made clear that the annexhated areas would maintain a distinct municipal budget and an excise-duty exhemption 
(Sai et al. 1970, 19–21) 
79
 Not all the propositions made by the commission were adopted. Indeed the commission had proposed to create 
a progressive local income tax (tassa diretta sull’agiatezza). Inspiring from the British “Betterment taxes” some 
kind of tax on land added value were also proposed. The municipality did not have the power to implement those 
solutions which would have required a national law.  (Volpi 1959, 24).  
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barrier which was separating the inner and outer part of the city. Excise-duties were to be 
collected in the whole city only on some large consumptions goods (beverages, meat, forage 
and building material)  through a “virtual barrier”. The reform was adopted in 1898 together 
with the imposta sul valore locativo (Volpi 1959, 24). 
Table 8 : The impact of the 1898  fiscal reform on Milan’s municipal revenues 
 Excise duty Aditional levies Other revenues total 
 Million lira current 
value 
   
1895 11 5 1 17 
1899 13 5 3 21 
1905 13.4 5.8 4.6 23.8 
Source : first two lines from Volpi (1959, 25), third line from Atti del Municipio di Milano 1906-1907   
 
The graph below shows the evolution of the fiscal revenues of Milan’s municipality from 
1880 to 1930.  
Figure 10 : Milan’s municipality fiscal revenues (1880-1930) 
 
Source : Dorigati and Molon (1982) based on Annuario statistico del Comune di Milano 
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 Milan’s fiscal reform was a major issue of that time. Various experts and policymakers participated to that 
debate. Somehow the principle of Milan’s municipal commission proposal were an anticipation of the 1930 
national municipal finance reform (§5.1). (Volpi 1959, 23) 
Milan’s municipality fiscal revenues in Million Lira – nominal 
value. a) excise duty, b) sovrimposta sui fabbricati (additional levy on 
building tax), c) tassa di famiglia (local progressive income tax), 
d)tassa esercizi e rivendita (licenses on commercial activities) e) 
imposta sul valore locativo (proportional tax on the cadastral rent of 
housing), f) imposta sulle aree fabbricabili (tax on building land), g) 
sovrimposta sui terreni (additional levy on property tax) 
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Thanks to the 1898 fiscal reform Milan’s municipal budget managed to balance or to have 
only a minor imbalance from 1900 to 1905. Between 1904 and 1908 Milan was faced to a 
major phase of demographic and urban growth (builded area increased from 10.2 to 15.5 
thousands of square meters). Public services and public networks required massive 
investments to follow such a bull urban transformation. In 1906 and even more in 1908 (also 
due to the international exposition costs) the municipal budget closed again with a 
significative imbalance (Volpi 1959, 27). During WWI municipal expenses (particularly 
investment ones) dropped down significantly and increased steeply after the war (Volpi 1959, 
28).  
Table 9 : Milan’s municipal budget balance / imbalance 
  
Fiscal 
revenues 
Non fiscal 
revenues
81
 
Total 
ordinary 
revenue
82
 
Ordinary 
expenses 
Ordinary 
budget 
balance 
Extraordinary 
expenses 
Total budget 
balance 
  I II III IV V=III-IV VI VII=III-IV-VI 
1888     18.4 16.9 1.5 24.56 -23.06 
1898 15.3 2.9 19.5 17.9 1.6 10.6 -9 
1903 20.8 4.8 27.2 22.2 5 5.4 -0.4 
1908 27.6 8.9 38.8 34 4.8 14.6 -9.8 
1913 35.4 12.1 53.3 43.2 10.1 13.58 -3.48 
1918 44.2 14.47 66.1 62.7 3.4 20 -16.6 
1921 155.9 32.3 200.8 185.6 15.2 102.2 -87 
Source : author’s elaboration from Sai et al (1970, 232) and municipal yearly financial reports, all figures in 
Million Italian Lira. 
 
We have discussed in the previous sections the revenues and the expenses of the municipality, 
the other part of the equation is given by borrowing which allowed to cover not only the 
capital expenditures but also the eventual imbalances on ordinary expenses as we will detail 
in §6.1 and 6.2. 
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 Non fiscal revenues are composed of tariff revenues from the following municipal services: tramways, 
electricity, water and sanitation. 
82
 Total ordinary revenues (column III) are not only the addition of fiscal and non fiscal revenues (columns I and 
III), there is a third addend, not given in the table, which is represented by the “rendite patrimoniali”. Under 
such a label are included : revenues from municipal buildings, revenues from government bonds, revenues from 
concessions to private companies (tramways to the Edison company). We have omitted them from the table since 
they always represented minor amounts.    
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6 Municipal financing tools  
In section 4 we gave an overview on the investments in water and sanitation infrastructure 
undertaken in Milan in the 1888-1924 time frame. Our figures give a total invested amount of 
96,5 million lira (nominal values) or 307 million lira (inflated to 1924 italian lira value). In 
this section we will analyse the financing tools implemented to mobilize such a massive 
amount of money.  
6.1 Borrowing regimes in Italian municipalities 
In paragaph 5.1 we draw a picture of local public finance framework in Italy in those years.  
With the 1859 and 1865 acts (refer to § 5.1) municipal budget had to be balanced. Debt could 
be part of the solution not only to finance capital expenditures (investments) but also to cover 
ordinary budget imbalances. In fact debt’s issued by Italian municipalities in those years can 
be classified in three categories : i)”budget’s imbalance solving debts” in municipalities with 
very low income population and minor economic development (thus with very low fiscal 
revenues), ii) debt issued to solve temporary imbalance due to external factors (economic 
crisis, war…) and iii) debt issued to finance major capital expenditures needed in 
municipalities facing a bull economic development (Dorigati and Molon 1982, 187).  
According to the 1865 act (Legge comunale e provinciale – articolo 137) the approval by the 
county administration (Provincia) was required for a municipality to subscribe any debt. No 
approval by the national parliament was needed. A municipality could borrow if the two 
following limits were fulfilled : i) the fifth of the ordinary revenues of the municipality had to 
be greater than the interest costs83 on the first year of amortization and ii) the revenue from 
the additional tax on properties was to be high enough to cover the debt service over the 
payback duration years. In the years afterwards progressively more constraints were provided 
for by law : the 1870 act84 limited the bonus -lots amounts on municipal bond85 while with the 
1874 act86, some limits on the obligatory expenses were established. With the 1880 Depretis 
reform project (which was not approved in the end) municipal loans representing more than 
one tenth of the ordinary municipal revenues or larger than 100 000 lira would have to be 
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 Including interests costs due to previously subscribed loans. 
84
 Legge 19 luglio 1970 n° 5704 
85
 Somma riservata a premi non superi 1/5 degli interessi annuali (Bufalini and Cavagna Sangiuliani di 
Gualdana 1881, 205) 
86
 Legge 14 giugno 1874 n°1961 
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authorised by a specific law made by the national parliament (Bufalini and Cavagna 
Sangiuliani di Gualdana 1881, 29). 
The municipalities could choose freely between issuing directly municipal bonds or 
subscribing loans using bank intermediation. Various kinds of financial institutions were 
operating in the latter category as lenders : the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, the various Casse di 
Risparmio, the various Banche Popolari and the standard commercial banks. 
The Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) had been created already in 1850 in the Regno di 
Sardegna inspiring from the French Caisse des depots et consignations. Later (in 1863, after 
the unification) it extended its activity to all of Italy. Municipalities and other local authorities 
could subscribe loans with CDP both for capital expenditures and for debts’ consolidation 
(debt previously subscribed). Debt’s consolidation loans were dominant over CAPEX ones 
between 1875 and 1923 except during the 1883 to 1895 years (Della Torre 2001, 20). Loans 
offered by CDP to municipalities had very interesting features such as low interest rates and 
no commission fees. Payback durations were initially quite short (10 years allowed in 1863) 
but longer payback duration were authorized afterwards (25 years allowed in 1875 and even 
more afterwards). At first the CDP was asking no collaterals except the enrolment within the 
municipal budget. However various municipalities were not paying back their debt, 
particularly in the South of Italy. As a solution to that problem after 1875 additional 
municipal taxes on properties were asked as a collateral for CDP loans87. Furthermore it was 
also asked that interest amount should not be higher than the fifth of the municipal revenues88. 
These two conditions limited the municipalities borrowing power and partially excluded some 
municipalities from accessing to CDP loans but protected effectively the CDP from 
insolvencies (Conte 2001, 121). 
In 1875 a major reform took place which allowed the CDP to collect savings using the postal 
offices network throughout the country. As a consequence the CDP started to have much 
more funds available for municipalities than prior to 1875. Indeed, after 1880, total loans from 
CDP to municipalities represented greater figures than those from all other banks (Della Torre 
                                                 
 
87
 The municipality would give delegations to the tax collector to payback and amortize the loan as a collateral 
(“delegazioni sull’esattore delle imposte dirette”)(Municipio di Milano 1907a).  
88
 The Milan city’s council documents show indeed that these two conditions had to be met to obtain the loan 
from CDP. This was not straightforward for Milan’s municipality since it had already touched the ceiling on the 
additional tax on properties. A waiver had to be obtained (Municipio di Milano 1907a).    
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2001, 20). Such a trend was even higher after 189689 when a special vehicle (Sezione 
autonoma di credito comunale e provinciale – SACCP) was created within CDP to channel 
additional money from the market to local authorities (Conte 2001, 141–142). 
Other major lenders to local authorities were the various Casse di Risparmio created in Italy 
through the 19th century. Among them, the Cassa di Risparmio di Milano which had been 
created in 1823 played a major role in channelling private savings to municipal budgets. The 
Cassa di Risparmio di Milano opened local branches all over the Lombardy region and was 
later rebaptized Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde – CARIPLO. We shall see in 
next paragraph that it was a major lender to Milan’s municipality asking as a collateral 
municipal properties through mortgage loans (credito fondiario).  
After the 1875 CDP reform the Casse di Risparmio were in competition90 with the CDP and 
the postal offices network. CDP had a fiscal advantage since its loans were not subjected to 
the imposta di ricchezza mobile91. Collected savings figures show however that total savings 
collected by postal offices were much lower than those collected by the Casse di Risparmio 
network92. This was particularly true in Lombardy where the CARIPLO was very well 
established (Della Torre 2001, 30,31). It is interesting to point out that municipalities had 
checking accounts in banks to manage their cash liquidity. Most of the time a Cassa di 
Risparmio was hosting the municipal checking account. Therefore funds from CDP loans 
were temporarily deposited in a Cassa di Risparmio. Additionally the final recipients paid on 
those loan funds (entrepreneurs, workmen, craftsmen) very often had their savings at the 
Cassa di Risparmio. In such a way a symbiosis existed in those years between the two 
financial circuits of the CDP and the Casse di Risparmio (De Cecco and Toniolo 2001, 
XXXIII) 
Until the end of the 19th century total municipal bond emission93 still represented the principal 
borrowing tool of Italian municipalities (2/3 of total municipal debt in 1877, 1/2 1896 and 1/6 
                                                 
 
89
 Legge 551/1896 and Legge 227/1897 
90
 The competition was considered unfair by the Casse di Risparmio (De Rosa 2003, 80).. 
91
 Indeed municipal bonds where subjected to the tax while state bonds were not. This fact was critized by local 
authorities (Municipio di Milano 1916). The municipality guaranteed a net interest to the lenders (bond 
subscribers). Thus the imposta di richezza mobile was an additional cost to be paid by the municipality when 
due. 
92
 Things changed only after 1925 when new savings products where commercialized by CDP through the postal 
network (Buoni Postali Fruttiferi). 
93
 In smaller size municipalities Municipal bonds were directly subscribed by local gentry while in larger cities 
banks were subscribing significant parts of the bonds too (della Torre 2003, 29). 
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in 1911). The new century was the turning point in the choice of borrowing tools by 
municipalities which subscribed loans either with the CDP (including the special vehicle 
SACCP) or with other financial institutions instead of issuing bonds. Furthermore some data 
seem to show that loans from SACCP-CDP where issued to a large extent to consolidate 
previous debts and thus convert municipal bonds in CDP loans (della Torre 2003, 23,33).      
6.2 Milan’s municipal debt 
During the decades we are focusing on, the municipality of Milan was engaged in a major 
phase of urban transformation. Massive investments were needed to expand the city’s area 
according to the city’s development masterplan (§ 2.3) implying the development of basic 
infrastructure such as streets, lighting, schools public transportation and last but not least 
water and sanitation assets. In §5.4 we have shown how tight were the financial constraints 
the city was facing at that time. Debt was the only possible choice to mobilize in the short run 
the vast amounts of money needed.  
In 1886 a 80 million municipal bond emission took place at a 4% nominal rate94 with a 75 
years duration. Its main scope was to consolidate with longer maturities and better interest 
rates all the previous loans (1854, 1860, 1861 and 1873) and to mobilize additional amounts 
of 14-15 million lira to finance public works planned the city’s development master plan 
recently approved (§2.3). In fact only the 1860 and 1873 loans were converted into to the 
1886 one while the conversion was not brought to completion for the 1854 and 1861 ones due 
to the poor condition of the financial market in 1890.  
On May the 21st 1890 a mortgage loan (conto corrente ipotecario or mutuo ipotecario) was 
approved by the City’s council and signed with the Cassa di Risparmio delle Province 
Lombarde for an amount of nearly 8 milion lira. Various municipal buildings were given as 
collateral. In fact it was supposed to be a short term credit (Atti del Municipio di Milano, May 
9th and 21st 1890 ) but apparently its payoff was postponed many times since on October 8th 
1923 the City’s council accepted to postpone the refund deadline to 1924 and 192595.  
                                                 
 
94
 In 1895 the 1886 municipal bond were exchanged at 94% of their nominal value. Thus, the effective interest 
rate was slightly higher than the 4 % nominal one. However Milan’s municipal bonds were quite well 
performing on the market since the emission discount was  lower than the one on the Italian state’s bonds. (Atti 
del Municipio di Milano 1895-1896). 
95
 In fact various conti correnti ipotecari were subscribed with the Cassa di Risparmio delle Province Lombarde. 
The 1923 document makes references to the following amounts : 3.650 000 lira – rogito dr Gorla 24 gennaio 
1899 ; 4 000 000 lira – rogito dr Gorla 26 marzo 1898 ; 1 460 000 lira – rogito dr Chierichetti 6 giugno 1908 ; 
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In 1897 a new municipal bond emission took place (Atti del Municipio di Milano, 1915-1916) 
and 15 millions lira were collected (while a 20 million lira size was planned at first). 
Collected amounts were allocated both to the conversion of the 1882 loan (11 millions lira) 
and to public works (including water and sanitation). The conditions of the subscription were 
designed to follow as much as possible the previous 1886 emission (4 % interest rate,  64 
years duration in order to have the same duration, similar amortization plan in order to have a 
simpler management of the lucky draw and paybacks). 
After the 1897 bond emission the municipality could not issue additional loans until 1904 
since no more collaterals could be found on the ordinary municipal budget surplus. 
Meanwhile in 1901 (April 24th ) a 1 milion lira short term loan (1-2 years) was approved by 
the city’s council specifically to finance investments in water and sanitation which could not 
be postponed. It had to be subscribed with the better offer to be found between the Banca 
Popolare di Milano, the Banca Commerciale Italiana or another bank (Atti del Municipio di 
Milano July 2nd 1900 and April 24th 1901). 
In 1905 and 1907 other short term credits were issued to face urgent needs : 16 million lira 
collected in 1905 as conti correnti (to be paid off by 1908) and 10 million lira collected in 
1907 (specifically to face the 1907 budget deficit) (Atti del Municipio di Milano 1906-1907). 
In 1907 a 70 million loan with the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti was approved by the city council 
with a payback period lasting until 1963 and a 4 % interest rate. It was specifically meant to 
finance municipal buildings, power industry, tramways, sanitation and water. Some funds on 
this loan were still available until 1913 (Sai et al. 1970, 231).  
Between 1910 and the end of First World War various loans were issued and concerned 
mainly dams and hydropower investments which were being undertaken by the municipality 
in Valtellina. In 1910 the Azienda Energetica Municipale (AEM) was created and gave a 
public company status to the power department which had been created within Milan’s 
municipal administration in 1903 (Pavese 1988, 540). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
541 500 lira rogito dr Candiani 1 agosto 1913 (Atti del Municipio di Milano, October 8th 1923). We make the 
hypothesis that the two 1899 and 1898 ones had been initially subscribed in 1890.   
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Box 1 
In 1915 a 1,65 M lira concessional loan (2% interest rate, 35 years of duration) to be subscribed with the Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti was approved in order to deviate and realize a 4.7 km artificial riverbed for the River Olona. 
Concessional conditions on the loan were available on a 100 M lira special fund which had been created to 
finance public works which could resorbe unemployment. The special fund96 was located at the Cassa Depositi e 
Prestiti and was meant for projects ready to  be implemented, driven by municipalities in financial distress in 
areas with high unemployment rate. Milan met all three conditions (Atti del Municipio di Milano 1914-1915, p 
38). 
Due to the war, in 1914 and 1915 the municipal budget had very large deficit. Short term 
municipal bonds (5 years, 20 M lira) were issued to face such an imbalance(Sai et al. 1970, 
231). After the war a 50 M lira municipal bond emission took place in 1919 at the same 
conditions97 (4% interest rate, same day of last payoff) of the 1886 and 1897 previous 
emissions.  
In 1920 and 1921 three large loans (respectively 40, 36 and 25 M lira) were subscribed with 
the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (Sezione Autonoma per il Credito Comunale e Provinciale). In 
1921 a 80 M lira loan was subscribed with the Cassa di Risparmio delle Province Lombarde. 
Unfortunately we lack of information on those years since various years of the city’s council 
reports are missing between 1919-1920 and 1923-1924 but it seems that those loans were 
needed to cover the municipal budget imbalance of those years (Atti del Municipio di Milano, 
1919-1920, p 618).  
                                                 
 
96
 created by the Decreto 22 setttembre 1914 n° 1028 
97
 The effective interest rate was higher than 4 % since subscribers paid 82,60 L in front of a 100 L coupon. On a 
41 years duration it means a 4,42 % effective interest rate (Atti del Municipio di Milano 1918-1919, p 456).  
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Table 10 : Milan’s municipality loans (1854 – 1922) 
Issuing 
Year  
Nominal 
amount 
Million 
Italian Lira 
nominal 
interest 
rate (%) 
Expiry 
date 
Lender Main scope comment 
1854 5840000 
svanziche 
5 1899     
1861 10   1916     Draw emission 
1866 5   1921     Draw emission 
1886 80 4 1960 bond 
emission 
  
  
1890 8     CARIPLO   2 bank accounts of 4 M Lira each 
1897 15   1960 bond 
emission     
1899  4.75 1933 CARIPLO Simplon 
railway tunnel   
1901 1   1902 
  sanitation Short term98 
1905 16   1908     Bank account 
1907 10         
10 milions  (3 in buoni fruttiferi and 7 with 
CARIPLO for the 1907 budget deficit) 
1906-1907  70 
4 - 3.9  1963 CDP 
buildings, 
electricity, 
tramways, 
sanitation, 
water 17 M al 4% ; 53 M al 3,9 % 
1910 8 4 1960 CARIPLO Power plants   
1909-1910 4.676   
  
various 
banks 
hydropower in 
Valtellina 
Short term promissory note 
1912     1961-1966 
CNP 
Pensions of the 
former 
municipal 
employees  CNP = Cassa Nazionale Previdenza 
1914 4.6 4 1963 
CDP 
hydropower in 
Valtellina 
 To convert the 1909 short term promissory 
notes 
1914 3.5 4 1963 
CDP 
istituti alta 
coltura   
1915 1.65 2 1950 CDP River Olona   
1916 20 
5 1921 
bond 
emission 
ordinary 
budget 
imbalance   
1917  1.5 
  
  BPM 
 checking account –allowing to wait for the 
disbursement of the 1914 power plant loan 
1919 50 4 1960 bond 
emission   
1920 40 3% 1955 
CDP   Sez autonoma per credito comunale e provinciale,  
1920 36 3% 1956 
CDP   Sez autonoma per credito comunale e provinciale,  
1921 25 5% 1956 
CDP   first draft of a total 120 million loan 
1921 8 
    
CARIPLO 
    
1922 8 
      Power plants   
 Source : author’s elaboration based on the Atti del Municipio di Milano [various years…], in grey loans and 
bonds on which water infrastructure has been financed at least partially 
                                                 
 
98
 Prestito breve termine per 1 Millione di lire per pagare i lavori fognatura tramite emissione buoni municipali 
di 6 mesi – 1 anno scontabili dalla banca popolare di milano o banca commerciale italiana o altra banca : tasso 
massimo del 4,5 %. Poi dopo il 1902 possono essere convertiti in un prestito più lungo 
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6.3 Financial engineering and institutions 
In this paragraph we will give some more details on how Milan’s municipal debt was 
subscribed and what were the principal financial institutions operating as mediators. 
Debt was globally managed to fund municipal needs and imbalances as a whole. Only in a 
few cases debt was issued to cover sector specific needs : for example the 1899 CARIPLO 
loan for the Simplon railway tunnel or the loans for the hydroelectric power plants. 
Long run and short run debt  
Debt was issued both with long run and short run payback durations. Long run debt was 
issued at fixed interest rate with very long payback durations (from 35-50 years for the CDP 
loans up to 75 years for the 1886 bond emission –Table 10). However Milan’s municipality 
was from time to time forced to recur to short term debt as a temporary solution allowing to 
wait for longer term debt to be issued. Indeed when issuing long term debt the municipality 
had to comply to some borrowing limits (§ 6.1) and short term debt could sometimes be the 
solution to bypass those limits. After the 1897 bond emission, Milan’s municipality could not 
issue more debt anymore until 1902 since the yearly budget surplus did not allow to cover 
additional debt service. Meanwhile, in 1901, a total amount of 1 million Lira of 6 months 
municipal debt certificates were issued at a 4.5% interest rate and discounted by the Banca 
Popolare di Milano, the Banca Commerciale Italiana or another bank. Such a short term debt 
urgently needed to undertake some sanitation investments would be converted in longer term 
debt when possible after 1902 (Atti del Municipio di Milano 1900-01,341). 
Another cause of short term debt was the quite long loan approval administrative process by 
CDP. Indeed, the municipality recurred to short term debt also in 1909-1910 and 1917 in 
order to fund hydropower plants in Valtellina. A loan with CDP for the same purpose was 
issued in 1914. The 1909-1910 promissory notes (vaglia cambiari) were issued while waiting 
for the CDP loan to be approved. The 1917 short term debt (conto corrente – checking 
account) with the Banca Popolare di Milano had to be subscribed since funds from the 1914 
CDP loan for hydropower plants were still not available (credit restriction due to the war 
period). 
Loans or bonds 
We have already mentioned that from the early of the 20th century Italian municipalities 
subscribing loans with financial intermediation rather than issuing municipal bonds (§6.1). 
Milan’s municipality too in the new century chose to borrow mainly through loans with 
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financial institutions (mainly with the CDP) rather than issuing more municipal bonds as in 
1886 and 1897. Indeed, the conditions offered by CDP were more attractive especially to 
finance public works requiring time spread disbursements due to various conditions : i)better 
fiscal conditions99,ii)better interest rate, iii) time-spread drawing according to the works 
rythm, iv) long duration (50 years), v) possibility to get a lower interest rate on postponed 
disbursements in the case that a decrease in the reference interest rate takes place (Municipio 
di Milano 1907a, VIII).       
Financial institutions 
Among the financial institutions the CDP became the first borrowing option for Milan’s 
municipality through the early 20th century as it offered better conditions. The second best 
choice for the municipality was represented by CARIPLO which asked municipal properties 
as a collateral100. Indeed such a second best option was practiced mainly when no additional 
taxes on properties could be used as collateral for a CDP loan. The availability of CARIPLO 
funds was limited too and Milan’s municipality could not use all the funds and leave nothing 
available for other municipalities of the region (Atti del Municipio di Milano 1918-1919; 
361,457). As a last option the municipality would borrow through the Banca Popolare di 
Milano (BPM) or through standard commercial banks101.  
Financial engineering  
Municipal bonds were largely used to covnert previously existing debts102 to longer durations. 
Most of the issued loans had a very long maturity. According to some authors savers in those 
years were trusting long term investments of that kind thanks to the gold standard comforting 
effect. In retrospect view however, those savers lost most of their money as the great inflation 
of the 1910-1930 years curbed down severely in real terms the profitability of their 
investments. Indeed, we will further analyse the key effect of inflation in paragraph 8.6 while 
                                                 
 
99
 CDP was exempted from the imposta di richezza mobile. In the previous bond emissions the municipality 
guaranteed a net interest to the lenders (bond subscribers). Thus the imposta di richezza mobile was an additional 
cost to be paid by the municipality when due. 
100
 in the framework of a conto corrente or a mutuo ipotecario 
101
 The name of the Banca Commerciale Italiana is quoted as an option too while some money was borrowed in 
the short term with the BPM (refer to previous page). 
102
 Holders of the 1882 loan could choose either to be paid back at the nominal value or to subscribe to the 1897 
municipal bond emission at a 4% interest rate (Atti del municipio di Milano 1895-1896) which payback would 
last until 1960. 
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section 8 will sketch what were the cost-sharing effects of these mechanisms in the long run. 
Who was the end-payer in fine in those schemes? 
Municipal bonds were issued with lots and premiums (emissione a premi). The draw calendar 
was defined at the emission and generally capital payback was not at all linear. For example 
according to the 1886 bond emission conditions, 157 bonds (cartelle) were to be paid back the 
first year and 4419 on the last year meaning 126 500 lira to reimburse the first year and 
3 683 000 to pay back in the last year (Atti del Municipio di Milano – 1889-1890). Interests 
were to be paid each trimester. In the 1897 emission the nominal value of the bonds had a 
large range (5000 lira, 1000 lira, 500 lira, 100 lira) adapted to various kinds of subcribers. 
Bonds were written in Italian, in French and in German and purchasable on various foreign 
financial markets (Paris, Geneva, Bern, Lyon and Bruxelles) showing that Milan’s 
municipality had the ambitions of collecting subscriptions abroad also thanks to the Union 
Latine which had been created in 1865. 
6.4 Financing tools for water and sanitation infrastructure 
In the previous paragraphs we gave an overview of the financing tools (bonds, loans, credit 
lines…) used by Milan’s municipality in the 40 years of our time frame. In a perfect world we 
would like to give full details and figures on the financing tools specifically used to finance 
water and sanitation infrastructure. Unfortunately this is possible only to a small extent. 
Indeed, as a matter of facts loans and bonds were financing Milan’s municipal budget as a 
whole and only in a few cases the reports written to justify the loan’s approval by the City’s 
council are available.  
After 1911 the water and sanitation accounting chapters (Allegato B) within the city’s 
financial report include the re-invocing of the debt service (interests on the capital invested  in 
the water and sanitation service). Three source of funding are mentioned : i) the municipal 
bonds (Prestito Unificato issued in 1886103, 1897 and 1919), ii) the 1906-1907 loan with the 
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti  and iii) “extraordinary credits on the municipal budget”. Figures are 
reported in Table 34 to Table 39 (§8.5). 
As we have discussed in § 5.3 only two major urban value capture operations were 
undertaken in 1885 (Foro Buonaparte area) and in 1905 (Saldini – Ponti policy).  With the 
                                                 
 
103
 An amount of 15 milion lira on the 1886 80 million municipal bond emission was allocated to public works 
including water and sanitation investments. 
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exception of these two urban operations value capture mechanisms did not play a significant 
role in financing Milan’s urban infrastructure including the water and sanitation one. 
7 Billing water and taxing sanitation 
This section is mainly focused on how revenues coming from the water and sanitation users 
were collected. While water was billed according to volumetric price (§7.1), on the contrary 
users were not charged a sanitation bill but a sanitation levy (§7.2). Although such a levy was 
very similar to a property tax, we argue that to our purpose it can be considered as a 
contribution to the “Tariff” part of the revenues (section 8). Doing so, we agree with 
Massarutto104 (2002; 2007).  
The last paragraph (§7.3) analyses the connection policy (compulsory connection fees or not) 
and the subscriptions’ rhythm. 
7.1 Water  
The first set of rules for the water supply service was approved in 1894 (Municipio di Milano 
1907b). Water tariffs were set as reported in Table 11. These were slightly volume regressive 
in order to encourage consumption. An annual fee had to be payed too depending on the 
diameter of the installed meter (
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 “It is often a pure terminologic convention that of considering revenues either as direct charges or taxation. 
What really matters is who pays, for what purpose and how much, and what is the customer actually obtaining in 
exchange of what is paid.”(Massarutto 2002, 25) 
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Table 12). Milan water tariff were in 1903 lower than in many other big Italian cities : 0.25 
lira/m3 in Naples, 0.23 lira/m3 in Torino, 0.30 lira/m3 in Verona, 0.25-0.30 lira/m3 in Bologna, 
0.27 lira/m3 in Bergamo, 0.40 lira/m3 in Firenze (Bigatti 1997, 113) 
Table 11: 1894 water tariff 
(m3/trimester) lira/ m3 
Up to 100 0.20 
101-300 0.19 
301-500 0.18 
501-1000 0.17 
1001-2000 0.16 
over 2001 0.15 
Source : author’s elaboration, data from Municipio di Milano (1907b) 
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Table 12: Meter rental fees 
Diameter (mm) 1884 rules   1907 rules 1912 rules 1920 rules 1929 
rules105 
 (Lira/year) (Lira/quarter) 
7-13 6 nd 5 7 nd 
15 7,20 1,80 10 15 nd 
20 9,60 2,40 15 22.50 64 
25 10,80 2,70 20 30 160 
30 12 5 25 37 180 
40 15 3,65 30 45 200 
50 18 4,5 35 60 300 
80 30 12 + 25 (intake 
fee106)  
40 75 400 
100 36 15 + 50 (intake fee) 50 100 600 
150 nd 18 + 75 (intake fee) 75 150 800 
Source : author’s elaboration, 1884 and 1907 data from Municipio di Milano (1907b); 1912 and 1920 data from 
Atti del Municipio di Milano 1919-1920, p736 ; 1929 data from (Comune di Milano 1935) 
 
In 1907 new water service regulations (Municipio di Milano 1907c) were approved with a 
simpler tariff construction (two consumption blocks instead of the six previously applied - 
Table 13). The concessional tariff (previously reserved to houses inhabited by the working 
class and hydraulic force usage) was extended to social housing and charities. The new tariff 
was supposed to give slightly lower revenues to the municipality. However the billing of a 
minimum consumption per trimester was made compulsory in order to guarantee a minimum 
“floor” revenue.  
Table 13: 1907 water tariff (also 1920 water tariff) 
(m3/quarter) Lira / m3 
Up to 1500 0.18  
Over 1500 0.15 
Concessional  0.10 
Source : author’s elaboration, data from Municipio di Milano (1907b) 
 
Table 14: 1912 water tariff 
(m3/quarter lira/ m3 
Up to 1500 0.10 
1501-2250 0.09 
2251-3000 0.08 
Over 3000 0.06 
Source : author’s elaboration, data from Atti del Municipio di Milano 1919-1920, p736 
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 The 1929 rules refer to an “intake fee” (canone di presa) rather than a meter rental fee. 
106
 “canone di presa” 
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Table 15: 1920 water tariff first proposal (not approved) 
(m3/quarter lira/ m3 
Up to 1500 0.15 
1501-3000 0.14 
3001-5000 0.13 
Over 5000 0.12 
Source : author’s elaboration, data from Atti del Municipio di Milano 1919-1920, p736 
 
Table 16: 1929 water tariff 
(m3/quarter) Lira / m3 
Up to 2000 0.35  
Over 2000 0.15 
Concessional  0.25 – 0.20 
Source : author’s elaboration, data from (Comune di Milano 1935) 
 
In 1912 a new and very degressive 4 blocks tariff (Table 14) was approved in order to 
discourage the growing trend of  private borehole drilling. Those private initiatives where 
source of concern due to the uncontrolled hygienic conditions of the water delivered. On the 
contrary the threat on municipal water revenues was not an issue (Atti del Municipio di 
Milano 1919-1920, p736). 
After the war in 1919 a tariff increase was needed since operational costs had increased due to 
the growth of energy price and to the reduction of the working hours from 12 to 8 hours a day. 
At first it was thought of a 4 blocks tariff but then it was chosen to go back to the 1907 two 
block tariff which could be more easily explained and accepted by the users while it would 
guarantee larger revenues to the municipality (Atti del Municipio di Milano 1919-1920, 
p736). The fixed part of the tariff to be paid every three months was significantly increased (
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Table 12). 
In 1929 a new tariff was approved with a very significant increase on the 1920 tariff. We lack 
of information on the 1929 tariff increase but we can easily guess that such a massive increase 
was unavoidable due to the great inflation of the twenties. 
7.2 Sanitation 
The first rules concerning the sanitation service were approved by Milan’s city council on 
June 5th 1888107 and concerned initially only the houses of the Foro Buonaparte and Via 
Dante area which were the first to be connected. Through the following years however those 
rules were applied to all buildings connected to the sewer system. According to the 1888 act a 
una tantum connection fee of 35 lira per meter of length of the front of the building was due. 
Its payment could be divided into various instalments over 5 years, meaning a yearly amount 
of 8.08 lira. Furthermore a yearly amount of 0.07 lira per m2 of total surface of the building 
was due in order to contribute to the operational costs. It is explicitly written than those 
contributions were far below the operational and capital expenditures (Atti del Municipio di 
Milano 1893-1894, p 355). 
Strictly speaking the first regulations for the sanitation service were approved by the city’s 
council in 1894 (Atti del Municipio di Milano 1893-1894, p 355). Both the connection fee and 
the yearly contributions were modified in order to encourage hygienic improvements in the 
houses where they were more needed. To such a purpose “sanitation fees should be designed 
so that a high income house should pay a greater fee than a middle income one which should 
pay more than a house inhabited by the working class. Specific mechanisms are designed to 
lower working class houses contributions”108.  
Box 1 : 1894 sanitation fees 
-Una tantum connection fee : c = a + b 
 a = 0.5 lira / m2 of covered surface ; minimum amount of 150 lira 
 b = 15 lira per each connection of the building to the sewer 
  -Yearly fee 
                                                 
 
107
 Regolamento provvisorio per la fognatura del nuovo corso dal Cordusio al Foro Buonaparte ed addiacenze, 
a copy is reported in Gentile et al. (1990, 90). It made compulsory for the landowners to connect to the sewer 
system and gave precise technical guidelines on how to connect properly the private building with the sewer 
system. 
108
 « …coll’intento pero’ di facilitare l’attuazione del risanamento domestico, nelle case che maggiormente ne 
hanno bisogno, proporzionando quindi la misura del corrispettivo per modo che una casa signorile sia chiamata 
ad un contributo maggiore di quella d’affitto del medio ceto e questa più di una casa d’operai. Per queste ultime 
si è inoltre creduto opportuno di stabilire norme speciali e facilitazioni a vantaggio dell’igiene”. 1894 (Atti del 
Municipio di Milano 1893-1894, p 355) 
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  Domestic buidlings : 0,02 lira / m2 of the total surface of all the floors (incl courtyards) 
 Factories : 0,01 lira/m3 of the 4/5 of the total volume of the building 
 Minimum amount of 30 lira 
All buildings older that the sewer system were exonerated from the connection fee and from the yearly fee for 
the first six years. 
 
1894 concessional fees 
-Small rented houses (max 3 rooms) having at least one third of the surface used for housing and having 
subscribed at least to a water subscription per floor were given a 50 % discount on the yearly sanitation fee and a 
concessional rate on water (0,10 lira/m3) 
-Houses owned by working class were a given a 50% discount on (a) connection fee (minimum of 75 lira) and 
on the yearly fee (minimum of 10 lira/year). The concessional rate on water (0,10 lira/m3) applied to them as 
well. 
 Source : author’s own elaboration based on Atti del Municipio di Milano 1893-1894, p366 
 
In 1907 new sanitation regulations were approved in order to collect higher revenues from the 
sanitation service. 
Box 2 : 1907 sanitation fees 
-Una tantum connection fee :  1 lira / m2 of covered surface ; minimum amount of 100 lira 
-Yearly fee y = x + z 
  x=0,03 lira / m2 of the total covered surface of all the floors, minimum 20 lira 
 z=max [0,03 lira / m2 of the total uncovered surface (including gardens for a maximum surface of 1000 
m2) ;  1,5 lira / meter of length of the front of the building ] 
All buildings older that the sewer system were exonerated from the connection fee and from the yearly fee for 
the first two year only. 
 
1907 concessional fees 
-Small rented houses (max 3 rooms) having at least one third of the surface used for housing and having 
subscribed at least to a water subscription per floor were given a 50 % discount on the yearly sanitation fee and a 
concessional rate on water (0,10 lira/m3) 
- Unrented houses with a fiscal value of no more than 500 lira connected to the water service were given a 50 % 
discount  
-Social housing respecting the criteria of the law n°254 of the 31st May 1903 were also awarderd a 50 % discount 
-Charities and many other municipal or governmental institutions were awarded a 50 % discount on the yearly 
fee only 
 Source : author’s own elaboration based on Municipio di Milano (1907d, 11) 
 
In 1920 the sanitation regulations were modified and the fees significantly increased since 
“although the sanitation system was put in place mainly for hygienic reasons, the building 
owners are getting so many benefits from the sewer system that it makes sense to ask them a 
larger contribution” (Atti del Municipio di Milano 1919-1920, p 920). Indeed after the war, 
the financial constraints of the municipality were so tight that all source of revenues were 
carefully reviewed in order to increase their contribution to the municipal budget. Concerning 
sanitation the yearly revenue should be increased from the previous 1 million lira to 4 millions 
lira in order to roughly balance the operational expenditures (1 million lira) and the debt 
service on the invested capital (4 millions) (Atti del Municipio di Milano 1919-1920, p 921). 
Box 3 : 1920 sanitation fees 
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-Una tantum connection fee :  4 lira / m2 of covered surface ; minimum amount of 400 lira 
-Yearly fee y = x + z 
  x=0,12 lira / m2 of the total covered surface of all the floors, minimum 20 lira 
 z=max [0,12 lira / m2 of the total uncovered surface (including gardens for a maximum surface of 1000 
m2) ;  6 lira / meter of length of the front of the building ] 
All buildings older that the sewer system were exonerated from the connection fee and from the yearly fee for 
the first year only. 
 
same concessional fees  as the 1907 ones) 
Source : author’s own elaboration based on Atti del Municipio di Milano (1919-1920, p 919) 
 
7.3 Connection policy  
Both in the 1891 and 1907 regulations the user was not charged any una tantum water 
connection fee as long as the water meter could be installed right at the entrance of the private 
property. Conversely full installations costs of any pipeline within the private property 
(upstream or downstream of the water meter) were to be charged to the user.  
Connections could be asked either by the owner or by the tenant. Tenant had however to ask a  
waiver to their owner. A deposit of 25 lira was due if the connection had not been asked by 
the building owner. 
In 1919 water connection fees were approved in order to increase the water service revenues 
(ref Table 17).  
Table 17 : 1919 water connection fees 
Diameter Connection fee (Lira) 
Up to 15 mm 50 
20-40 mm 100 
50 mm 200 
Over 50 mm To be discussed on a case by case basis 
 Source : author’s elaboration based on on Atti del Municipio di Milano (1919-1920, p 919) 
 
While users were not asked any fees to connect to the water service until 1919, a sanitation 
connection fee was considered already by the 1888 fees setting. The 1894 sanitation 
regulation forbid to build cesspools in all new houses built in street with an existing sewer and 
made compulsory for them to be connected to the sewer system. Meanwhile previously 
existing houses were given a six years deadline to connect to the sewer system. In case they 
connected before the deadline they were anyway exonerated from paying the yearly sanitation 
fee for the first six years. The new 1907 regulations shortened the exoneration from six to two 
years since “now the connection to the sewer system is not anymore seen as a constraint and 
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is instead asked by the building owners themselves109”. Such an exoneration period was 
shortened again to one year in 1920. 
At first the connections were quite timid. Indeed in 1897 there were roughly 8000 houses in 
Milan. Only 21 % of them was connected to the water supply and only 15 % to the sewer 
system. In 15 years the connections had significantly increased as just before WWI 81% of 
the houses were connected to the water network and 77% to the sewer system (Bigatti 2000, 
223). In 1926 however percentages had slightly decreased as only 72.6 % of the house were 
connected to the drinking water network. Furthermore, such a global average hides the fact 
that access to the water service was not equally widespread on all social classes. Indeed only 
43.7% of the working class houses were connected to the water network versus 75.25 among 
the other houses (Table 18). Such a variability among social classes in the access to hygienic 
conditions confirms what we already showed in §2.4 concerning housing conditions : Milan’s 
urban “fast and furious” urban development implied harsh inequality in the living conditions.   
Table 18 : percentage of houses without drinking water, latrine or bathroom in Milan in 1926 
  working class others global 
  
% % % 
flat without drinking water 56.7 24.65 37.42 
flat without latrine and water 68.54 34.37 48 
flat without bathroom 94.1 64.84 76.5 
Source : author’s translation based on Buzzi Donato (1969, 22), the percentage are expressed in terms of the total 
number of houses inhabited by each category (working class and others respectively). 
8 Financial flows of the water and sanitation services 
In the previous section we have discussed how water and sanitation revenues were collected. 
In this paragraph we will analyse the global picture of Milan WSS’s financial flows. The 
institutional scheme and the associated financial flows (1888-1924) are schematized in the 
following figure and table. Water and sanitation were municipally managed and their budget 
was part of the city’s general budget (the grey shaded area in the figure below). We analysed 
various years of the city’s annual financial report. We adopted the classical 3 T’s OECD 
approach(OECD 2009) in our analysis and built a simple model to analyse the cost sharing 
between the Tariff revenues and the Tax revenues. The first two paragraphs (§8.1 and §8.2) 
describe the available data. §8.3 is focused instead on the results of our computations 
                                                 
 
109
 “ …ora che l’impianto di fognatura non è più considerato come un aggravio, ma insistemente invocato dagli 
stessi proprietari di case ( che possono cosii ridurre i loro stabili in migliori condizioni di affittanza, eliminando 
in pari tempo le difficoltà e gli inconvenienti dello spurgo dei pozzi neri)” (Municipio di Milano 1907d, 3) 
  
58
concerning the OPEX cost sharing. In § 8.4 and §8.5 we discuss capital expenditures and 
debt’s service.  The role of inflation is analysed in §8.6. The last two paragraphs (§8.7 and 
§8.8) concern intergenerational issues. 
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Figure 11 : Institutional scheme and financial flows of Milan’s WSS (1888-1924) 
 
Source : author’s elaboration 
 
Table 19 : Water, sanitation accounting scheme and model (1888-1924) 
Cost 
classification Accounting entries in use Content’s description Approach in our model 
OPEX 
Internal OPEX : Data in 
the Water and Sanitation 
ordinary expenses chapters  
-energy,  
-most salaries of the 
technical staff 
-ordinary maintenance 
expenses 
Summarized from the existing 
data in the Water and Sanitation 
ordinary expenses chapters 
External OPEX : Within 
other chapters of the city’s 
financial report, unknown 
for the 1888 - 1910 years, 
mentioned distinctly and 
reinvoiced after 1911 
- management and office 
clerk salaries 
- paper, office lighting and 
heating, 
 -cars  
Unknown for the 1888 - 1910 
years, mentioned distinctly and 
reinvoiced after 1911 
Debt service 
In the city’s global debt 
service chapter, partially 
reinvoiced to the water and 
sanitation chapters after 
1911 
 
Estimated through our debt 
amortization model, data for the 
1911-1924 years used as a test 
(§8.5) 
 
New 
investments 
In the water, sanitation and 
canals extraordinary 
expenses chapters  - each 
loan has its own 
extraordinary expenses 
accounting fund 
 
New investments are paid by 
extraordinary expenses funds 
coming from the loans subscribed. 
They are taken into account only 
through the debt service. 
Source : author’s elaboration 
 
 
 
Lenders / 
eventually with 
bank 
intermediation 
OPEX 
New investments 
Debt service 
Domestic 
water users 
 
« Tariff » revenues 
Water and 
sanitation service 
Costs 
Sanitation levy 
Water bills  
City of  
Milan 
 
Landlords 
City’s global 
accounting sections 
Loans specific funds 
for extraordinary 
expenses 
Loans payback 
Loans funds (t=0) 
Reinvoiced (after 1911) 
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8.1 Data on Tariff revenues and OPEX 
The city’s annual financial report (Conto consuntivo dell’anno) included distinct accounting 
chapters for water and sanitation. 
The city’s annual financial report in those years adopted a very classical accounting scheme: 
Entrata (revenues) and Uscita (expenses) which were subdivided into ordinairie (ordinary) 
and extraordinarie (extraordinary) ones. The ordinary expenses represent Operational 
expenditures (OPEX) while the extraordinary ones represent Capital expenditures (CAPEX) 
Revenues coming from “Tariffs” in those years were coming from the domestic water users 
through water billing and from the landlords which were paying a sanitation levy which might 
be considered to our pourpose as a contribution to the “Tariff” part of the revenues. 
Additional revenues were also coming from the una tantum connection fees due mainly for 
the sanitation service but also for the water service after 1920 (refer also to § 7.3). All these 
revenues were flowing into the general municipal budget and not directly channeled towards 
the water and sanitation service.   
Data available include distinct Tariff revenues for both the water and sanitation services. We 
have excluded from water Tariff internal billing for water consumption by municipal 
buildings.   
On the costs side three main categories should be distinguished: Operational expenditures 
(OPEX), the debt service and new investments expenditures (Capital expenditures – CAPEX). 
At first only a fraction of operational expenditures was accounted for in the water and 
sanitation chapter of the city’s financial report (energy, most salaries of the technical staff and 
ordinary maintenance expenses). On the contrary a part of the expenses (management and 
office clerk salaries, paper, office lighting and heating, cars) was mixed up in the various 
global chapters of the city’s budget (we will refer to these as OPEX external costs). Only after 
1911 (Atti del Municipio 1912-1913) operational expenses include a re-invoicing of those 
expenses previously mixed up in other accounting chapters. The expenses re-invoiced from 
general accounting chapters of the city budget (which we shall refer to as OPEX*) are a 
significant fraction of watsan OPEX as the Table 20 shows. Re-invoiced expenses fluctuate 
between 13 and 25 % of the water OPEX. Sanitation re-invoiced expenses have similar 
figures than the water ones but they represent a much larger fraction of the sanitation total 
sanitation OPEX expenses which are indeed much smaller than water ones (from 25 to 47 % 
of the OPEX expenses). Generally speaking it is well known that internal re-invoicing 
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amounts are not always truthful. It is impossible to tell whether these re-invoiced expenses 
were below or above the real figures. In other words it is hard to find whether hidden cross-
financing was flowing from the water and sanitation accounts to the city’s general budget or 
the opposite way.  
 Table 20 : Fraction of WSS OPEX  reinvoiced from general accounting chapters 
  Water sanitation  total   
Year OPEX [Lira] 
OPEX* 
[Lira] % 
OPEX 
[Lira] 
OPEX 
[Lira] % OPEX [Lira] OPEX [Lira] % 
1911 683 808 87 631 13 250 804 66 087 26 934 612 153 718 16 
1914 893 361 224 786 25 261 861 66 350 25 1 155 222 291 136 25 
1917 1 341 658 277 673 21 210 614 55 057 26 1 552 272 332 730 21 
1920 3 308 380 510 620 15 1 127 133 508 397 45 4 435 513 1 019 017 23 
1923 4 869 846 694 284 14 1 074 720 432 684 40 5 944 566 1 126 968 19 
1924 5 324 441 917 638 17 1 411 629 662 204 47 6 736 070 1 579 842 23 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Conto consuntivo dell’anno…; OPEX* stands for the fraction of OPEX 
reinvoiced from general accounting chapters within the city’s budget.  
 
8.2 Data on CAPEX and debt service 
The debt service expenditures were accounted for in a global expenses chapter. Before 1911 
no reference is made to debt service in the water and sanitation accounting chapters. After 
1911 debt service expenses are partially re-invoiced in the water and sanitation accounting 
chapters. Table 34 to Table 39 (in Appendix 4) report the debt service figures re-invoiced to 
Water and sanitation accounts in 1911, 1914, 1917, 1920, 1922 and 1924. In most of those 
years the debt service was only representing the interests (4% for the two first lines of the 
tables and 5 % for the last line) while it did not include the capital payback. Only in 1914, 
1920 and 1924 a line “capital amortization” is inserted but only per memoria to quote the 
figures but it did not contribute to the debt service re-invoiced to water and sanitation 
accounting chapters. In 1924 the water and sanitations figures of this line were computed by 
the municipality respectively with a 5% amortization coefficient (meaning a 20 years long 
amortization) and a 3% amortization coefficient (meaning a 33 years long amortization). 
These amortization duration appeav r very short for such long lasting assets which in many 
case are still in use nowadays. 
8.3 Results on OPEX costs sharing 
Revenues, OPEX and Gross Profit (expressed as the difference between revenues and OPEX) 
are reported Table 21. It appears clearly that until 1899 “Tariff” revenues were not even 
sufficient to cover the OPEX costs both for water and sanitation even without considering 
“hidden subsidies” (Water and sanitation OPEX external costs). By definition, costs 
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uncovered by “Tariff” revenues are covered by the City’s general budget, meaning “Tax” 
revenues according to the OECD definition. After 1899 “Tariff” revenues were covering 
OPEX costs both for water and sanitation (which did not include OPEX external costs at that 
time). We make the hypothesis that such an threshold was reached in 1899 when some 
economies of scale were obtained with a greater number of users (meaning larger revenues) in 
front of operational expenditures nearly constant or decreasing. Indeed tariff revenues were 
increasing since : i) the quantity of water metered and billed doubled from 1.17 to 2.42M m3, 
ii) the number of private water meter reached 2538 and iii) the number of buildings connected 
to sanitation and paying the sanitation levy was getting higher110 (142 connected in 1893, 227 
connected in 1894 and 464 connected in 1895).    
Table 21 : Revenues, OPEX and gross profit of Milan’s WSS (1890-1924), all values in Lira 
Water  Sanitation Total  
years Revenues OPEX 
Gross 
profit Revenues OPEX 
Gross 
profit Revenues OPEX 
Gross 
profit 
1890 12 497 31 631 -19 134 2 748 1 939 809 15 245 33 570 -18 325 
1891 34 122 34 518 -396 4 524 9 825 -5 301 38 646 44 343 -5 697 
1892 57 860 57 446 414 14 626 14 625 1 72 486 72 071 415 
1893 78 581 78 485 96 16 927 17 406 -479 95 508 95 891 -383 
1894 114 460 115 767 -1 307 22 000 28 413 -6 413 136 460 144 180 -7 720 
1895 144 004 144 086 -82 28 272 31 264 -2 992 172 276 175 350 -3 074 
1896 181 980 197 496 -15 516 55 392 61 298 -5 906 237 372 258 794 -21 422 
1897 252 618 288 143 -35 525 59 334 72 425 -13 091 311 952 360 568 -48 616 
1898 330 156 334 414 -4 258 76 166 97 717 -21 551 406 322 432 131 -25 809 
1899 445 379 378 423 66 956 87 694 54 317 33 377 533 073 432 740 100 333 
1900 525 637 329 848 195 789 139 630 46 805 92 825 655 251 376 653 288 614 
1901 586 443 174 193 412 250 149 743 59 221 90 522 729 586 233 414 502 772 
1902 722 846 210 884 511 962 173 102 71 696 101 406 895 948 282 580 613 368 
1903 839 869 222 653 617 216 205 275 71 311 133 964 1 045 144 293 964 751 180 
1904 1 042 030 253 373 788 657 294 598 69 995 224 603 1 302 694 323 368 1 013 260 
1905 1 132 347 364 402 767 945 328 035 87 683 240 352 1 460 382 452 085 1 008 297 
1906 1 476 819 452 031 1 024 788 390 594 77 034 313 560 1 867 413 529 065 1 338 348 
1908 1 948 968 627 934 1 321 034 489 603 151 599 338 004 2 438 571 779 533 1 659 038 
1911 2 779 809 683 808 2 096 001 756 006 204 000 552 006 3 535 815 887 808 3 535 815 
1914 2 721 329 893 361 1 827 968 821 386 261 861 559 525 3 542 715 1 155 222 2 387 493 
1917 3 588 139 1 341 658 2 246 481 951 254 210 614 740 640 4 539 394 1 552 272 2 987 121 
1920 6 350 218 3 308 380 3 041 838 2 039 236 1 127 133 912 103 8 389 454 4 435 513 3 953 941 
1923 9 618 500 4 869 846 4 748 654 3 105 251 1 074 720 2 030 531 11 258 501 5 944 566 6 779 185 
1924 9 553 103 5 324 441 4 228 662 5 533 857 1 411 629 4 122 228 14 038 096 6 736 070 8 350 890 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Conto Consuntivo dell’anno… [various years] 
 
                                                 
 
110According to the 1894 sanitation rules building connecting to the sewer system were exonerated from paying 
the sanitation levy for 6 years (refer to § 7.3). Building connected in 1893 / 1894 were starting to pay the levy in 
1899. 
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Revenues from the sanitation service were always lower than those of the water service which 
is not surprising. In parallel sanitation operational expenditures very low (much lower than 
water OPEX) since the sewer system was gravity based and no waste water treatment was in 
place. 
8.4 Capital expenditures and debt service  
As in many infrastructure sectors water and sanitation are economic activities where capital 
expenditures are predominant over operational expenditures. Capital expenditures were 
financed mainly through debt as we showed in the previous sections. What was the return on 
invested capital given by the available gross profits? Where gross profit high enough to fully 
cover debt’s service (capital payback and interests)? This paragraph will answer these 
questions. 
Water, sanitation and total data are summarized in Table 22, 
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Table 23 and 
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Table 24. A first evaluation is given by a rate of return on invested capital index computed as 
the percentage ratio between gross profit and invested capital up to that year. Such an index is 
negative before 1899 since gross profit is negative too. Concerning water only, after 1901 the 
rate of return is greater than 10% which might be considered an acceptable figure. The rate of 
return given by sanitation’s gross profits is instead extremely low (always below 5 % except 
the 1924 value) meaning that undertaken investments were really huge compared to the 
profits given by that service. As a consequence the total rate of return of the investments is 
quite low too (never above 10 % and above 5% only after 1904).  
We also built a debt model in order to simulate a virtual debt service. Our debt service model 
(fully described in Appendix 2) gives a debt service value (capital payback and interests) is 
based on the following basic assumptions : 4.5 % interest rate, 50 years payback duration with 
no grace period, linear amortization, disbursement calendar following the capital expenditures 
calendar. Such a model is very basic and might only be able to give an order of magnitude 
indication. 
After 1900 water gross profits are greater than our debt’s service estimation. On the contrary 
sanitation gross profits are never high enough to cover our debt’s service estimation (except in 
1924). As a consequence the total gross profits of the two services are not large enough to 
cover our debt service model estimation except in the last years (1920,1923,1924). 
We have also tested the sensitivity of our model to the payback duration with two other 
hypothesis (35 years and 70 years). The results (given in appendix 2) confirm a negative net 
profit for the water and sanitation service in all years except in the last years. This is also due 
to the effect of inflation which in the 1920’s absorbed a significant part of the debt’s service 
in real terms as we show in §8.6. 
Table 22 : Water service financial flows (1889-1924)   
Water (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) = 100*c/d (f) (g) = c-f 
years Revenues OPEX 
Gross 
profit 
Invested 
capital 
Return on 
capital % 
Debt 
service Net profit 
1889 2 960 0 0 547 081 0.00 34 955 -34 955 
1890 12 497 31 631 -19 134 777 607 -2.46 49 240 -68 374 
1891 34 122 34 518 -396 1 085 458 -0.04 68 273 -68 669 
1892 57 860 57 446 414 1 155 010 0.04 71 755 -71 340 
1893 78 581 78 485 96 1 372 981 0.01 84 687 -84 591 
1894 114 460 115 767 -1 307 1 542 981 -0.08 94 348 -95 655 
1895 144 004 144 086 -82 1 843 138 0.00 112 200 -112 282 
1896 181 980 197 496 -15 516 2 101 730 -0.74 127 117 -142 633 
1897 252 618 288 143 -35 525 2 364 558 -1.50 142 072 -177 597 
1898 330 156 334 414 -4 258 2 891 144 -0.15 173 698 -177 956 
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1899 445 379 378 423 66 956 3 053 581 2.19 181 509 -114 553 
1900 525 637 329 848 195 789 3 086 801 6.34 180 890 14 899 
1901 586 443 174 193 412 250 3 468 554 11.89 202 582 209 668 
1902 722 846 210 884 511 962 3 893 542 13.15 226 702 285 260 
1903 839 869 222 653 617 216 4 318 496 14.29 250 437 366 779 
1904 1 042 030 253 373 788 657 4 835 560 16.31 279 694 508 963 
1905 1 132 347 364 402 767 945 5 516 297 13.92 318 978 448 967 
1906 1 476 819 452 031 1 024 788 6 696 881 15.30 389 688 635 100 
1908 1 948 968 627 934 1 321 034 8 565 922 15.42 496 960 824 074 
1911 2 779 809 683 808 2 096 001 10 850 069 19.32 618 214 1 477 787 
1914 2 721 329 893 361 1 827 968 12 621 096 14.48 700 919 1 127 049 
1917 3 588 139 1 341 658 2 246 481 13 826 663 16.25 743 051 1 503 430 
1920 6 350 218 3 308 380 3 041 838 17 265 508 17.62 924 973 2 116 865 
1923 9 618 500 4 869 846 4 748 654 26 307 132 18.05 1 450 995 3 297 659 
1924 9 553 103 5 324 441 4 228 662 31 189 847 13.56 1 740 301 2 488 361 
Source : author’s elaboration, all data in Italian Lira  
 
  
67
Table 23 : Sanitation service financial flows (1889-1924)   
Water (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) = 100*c/d (f) (g) = c-f 
years Revenues OPEX 
Gross 
profit 
Invested 
capital 
Return on 
capital % 
Debt 
service Net profit 
1889              -                   -                  -              209 200         -             13 404    -       13 404    
1890         2 748            1 939              809            592 419      0.14           37 781    -       36 972    
1891         4 524            9 825   -       5 301         1 134 189    - 0.47           71 975    -       77 276    
1892       14 626          14 625                 1         1 989 114      0.00         125 755    -      125 754    
1893       16 927          17 406   -          479         3 253 927    - 0.01         205 039    -      205 518    
1894       22 000          28 413   -       6 413         4 211 279    - 0.15         263 477    -      269 890    
1895       28 272          31 264   -       2 992         4 951 245    - 0.06         307 118    -      310 110    
1896       55 392          61 298   -       5 906         5 957 116    - 0.10         367 139    -      373 045    
1897       59 334          72 425   -     13 091         7 217 014    - 0.18         442 537    -      455 628    
1898       76 166          97 717   -     21 551         8 562 184    - 0.25         522 267    -      543 818    
1899       87 694          54 317         33 377         9 874 093      0.34         598 654    -      565 277    
1900      139 630         46 805         92 825        10 830 780     0.86         651 091    -      558 266    
1901      149 743         59 221         90 522        11 659 016     0.78         694 433    -      603 911    
1902      173 102         71 696        101 406        12 691 995     0.80         750 154    -      648 748    
1903      205 275         71 311        133 964        13 530 630     0.99         792 488    -      658 524    
1904      294 598         69 995        224 603        14 621 523     1.54         850 237    -      625 634    
1905      328 035         87 683        240 352        15 932 958     1.51         921 140    -      680 788    
1906      390 594         77 034        313 560        17 906 392     1.75      1 033 298    -      719 738    
1908      489 603        151 599        338 004        22 231 532     1.52      1 276 213    -      938 209    
1911      756 006        204 000        552 006        33 931 109     1.63      1 955 344    -   1 403 338    
1914      821 386        261 861        559 525        42 787 900     1.31      2 423 090    -   1 863 565    
1917      951 254        210 614        740 640        46 673 265     1.59      2 551 211    -   1 810 571    
1920   2 039 236     1 127 133        912 103        49 217 013     1.85      2 587 265    -   1 675 162    
1923   3 105 251     1 074 720     2 030 531        58 343 904     3.48      3 030 920    -   1 000 389    
1924   5 533 857     1 411 629     4 122 228        65 364 758     6.31      3 428 447           693 781    
Source : author’s elaboration, all data in Italian Lira  
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Table 24 : Water and sanitation services global financial flows (1889-1924)   
Water (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) = 100*c/d (f) (g) = c-f 
years Revenues OPEX 
Gross 
profit 
Invested 
capital 
Return on 
capital % 
Debt 
service Net profit 
1889  2 960     -       -       756 281     -       48 360    -48 360    
1890  15 245     33 570    -18 325     1 370 026    -1.34     87 020    -105 345    
1891  38 646     44 343    -5 697     2 219 648    -0.26     140 248    -145 945    
1892  72 486     72 071     415     3 144 124     0.01     197 509    -197 094    
1893  95 508     95 891    -383     4 626 908    -0.01     289 726    -290 109    
1894  136 460     144 180    -7 720     5 754 260    -0.13     357 825    -365 545    
1895  172 276     175 350    -3 074     6 794 383    -0.05     419 318    -422 392    
1896  237 372     258 794    -21 422     8 058 846    -0.27     494 255    -515 677    
1897  311 952     360 568    -48 616     9 581 572    -0.51     584 609    -633 225    
1898  406 322     432 131    -25 809     11 453 328    -0.23     695 965    -721 774    
1899  533 073     432 740     100 333     12 927 674     0.78     780 163    -679 830    
1900  655 251     376 653     288 614     13 917 581     2.07     831 981    -543 367    
1901  729 586     233 414     502 772     15 127 569     3.32     897 015    -394 243    
1902  895 948     282 580     613 368     16 585 537     3.70     976 856    -363 488    
1903  1 045 144     293 964     751 180     17 849 126     4.21     1 042 925    -291 745    
1904  1 302 694     323 368     1 013 260     19 457 083     5.21     1 129 931    -116 671    
1905  1 460 382     452 085     1 008 297     21 449 254     4.70     1 240 118    -231 821    
1906  1 867 413     529 065     1 338 348     24 603 273     5.44     1 422 986    -84 638    
1908  2 438 571     779 533     1 659 038     30 797 454     5.39     1 773 173    -114 135    
1911  3 535 815     887 808     3 535 815     44 781 179     7.90     2 573 559     962 256    
1914  3 542 715     1 155 222    2 387 493     55 408 997     4.31     3 124 008    -736 515    
1917  4 539 394     1 552 272    2 987 121     60 499 928     4.94     3 294 262    -307 141    
1920  8 389 454     4 435 513    3 953 941     66 482 521     5.95     3 512 238     441 703    
1923  11 258 501     5 944 566    6 779 185     84 651 035     8.01     4 481 915     2 297 270    
1924  14 038 096     6 736 070    8 350 890     96 554 604     8.65     5 168 748     3 182 142    
Source : author’s elaboration, all data in Italian Lira  
 
8.5 Comparing re-invoicing debt service and estimated debt service 
Table 25 compares CAPEX figures coming from two different parts of the municipal yearly 
financial report. CAPEX figures on the left side of the table are the same as in Figure 6 and 
§4.3 and come from the “extraordinary expenses” accounting sections of the municipal budget 
(we shall refer to it as “investments CAPEX”). CAPEX figures on the right side of the table 
are used in the ordinary expenses chapters to re-invoice debt service (we shall refer to it as 
“re-invoicing CAPEX”), they are the same figures as in Tables 13-17.  Table 25 also 
compares the re-invoiced yearly debt service from the accounting chapters (Table 13-17) with 
the debt service estimated by our model (interests only in the column “interests” and  interests 
plus capital amortization in the column “debt service”.  
The two series are quite different : until 1914 figures from re-invoicing CAPEX are much 
lower than investments CAPEX  ones. In the same years the estimated  interest and debt 
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service values are greater than the re-invoiced interests costs showing that investments costs 
were not fully accounted for in the water and sanitation service accounting chapters. 
In 1917, 1920 and 1922  re-invoicing CAPEX figures are greater than investments CAPEX 
ones, particularly concerning sanitation.  Interests re-invoiced are greater than estimated 
interests. In those years re-invoicing CAPEX figures are so overestimated that interests costs 
based on these figures are roughly the same order of magnitude as our estimated debt service 
which include both interests and capital amortization. Quite awkward indeed. 
In 1924 re-invoicing CAPEX are the same order of magnitude of the investments CAPEX 
ones (less than 10 % of difference), slightly over estimated for sanitation and under estimated 
for water.  Re-invoiced interests are greater than estimated interests but lower than estimated 
total debt service. 
Table 25 : CAPEX, interests and debt service : model estimation and accounting historical data (1911-
1924) 
Capex from Atti del Municipio di Milano, interests and debt service estimated by our model accounting historical data (Tables 13-17) 
water  Sanitation  Total   water Sanitation  Total  
year Capex interests Debt service Capex interests Debt service Capex interests Debt service Capex interests Capex interests Capex interests 
1911 10 850 401 618 33 931 1 277 1 955 44 781 1 678 2 574 5 100 204 14 000 560 19 100 764 
1914 12 621 448 701 42 788 1 567 2 423 55 409 2 016 3 124 7 109 284 24 000 960 31 109 1 244 
1917 13 827 467 743 46 673 1 618 2 551 60 500 2 084 3 294 19 009 879 62 000 1 910 81 009 2 789 
1920 17 266 580 925 49 217 1 603 2 587 66 483 2 183 3 512 19 595 897 62 073 2 802 81 668 3 699 
1922 22 615 782 1 235 55 684 1 797 2 911 78 299 2 579 4 145 22 650 1 050 66 440 3 020 89 090 4 070 
1924 31 190 1 117 1 740 65 365 2 121 3 428 96 555 3 238 5 169 19 595 1 205 69 760 3 186 89 355 4 391 
Source : author’s elaboration, all data in thousand Lira 
 
In light of the previous comparisons it seems that re-invoiced CAPEX and debt service were 
not fully truthful and were over estimated or under estimated according to the city’s financial 
constraints and accounting appearance needs. Thus we think that the “investment CAPEX” 
figures are more reliable than the re-invoicing ones. Similarly although our debt service is 
very basic we think that to the purpose of our research it may be valuable to give useful 
informations in terms of order of magnitude. Except when specifically stated differently, all 
our research is based on the investment CAPEX data series and on the debt service figures 
estimated by our model and not on the re-invoicing ones. 
8.6 Inflation 
We saw in the previous paragraph that the debt service’s amount, while staying almost 
constant, represented progressively a lower percentage of the water and sanitation budget. 
Indeed Tariff revenues and OPEX expenses increased significantly in those years while debt 
service stayed nearly constant. Inflation has played a key role in the borrowing-lending 
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relationship in determining in fine the cost-sharing equilibrium between the lender and the 
borrower. Indeed, all the loans issued by the city of Milan in those years had a fixed rate and 
most of them had long payback durations between 35 and 75 years. The great inflation rate of 
the 1910-1940 years in Italy had the effect of absorbing a significant part of the debt’s 
residual burden, transferring it, from a long run point of view, away from the borrower on the 
lenders111. The graph below compares the real debt service with no inflation and a “virtual” 
debt service increased by an inflation index112 as if the interest rate was indexed-link to 
inflation. While until 1915 inflation has a minor role (the two functions are very close), after 
1916 Italian annual inflation rates increased significantly and debt service with inflation 
diverts from the no inflation curve. The area between the two curves which goes increasing is 
a good proxy of the lenders progressive absorption of significant part of the debt’s service in 
real terms.  
 
Figure 12 : Estimated debt service in thousand Lira (1888-1944), comparison with or without inflation 
 
Source : author’s elaboration, all values in thousand Italian Lira 
 
                                                 
 
111
 Of course this a schematic view:  “the lender” is a virtual entity as the bonds were exchanged on the market.  
112
 We have computed “virtual inflated debt service” as the sum of two elements : i) capital payback (no inflation 
on this) and interests which have been inflated using an inflation index. The inflation index is equal to 1 in 1988 
and comes from ISTAT, serie storica, tavola 21.7  
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Indeed, as the Table 26 shows, total inflated debt service represents roughricaly 90.6 M Lira 
over the 1889-1942 period while no inflated one represents only 63.1 M Lira, meaning that in 
real terms a significant part of the debt’s burden has been absorbed by the lenders (bond 
subscribers or instititutional lenders). In terms of long run cost-sharing equilibrium, inflation 
has played a key role since part of the capital costs have been taken away from the water, 
sanitation budget.  
Table 26 : Total debt service over periods of 9 years, comparison with or without inflation 
    
debt service 
  
difference 
  
    a b c = b-a d=100*c/b 
from to 
no 
inflation 
with 
inflation   % 
1889 1897 2627.3 2677.2 49.9 1.9 
1898 1906 9017.9 9213.9 195.9 2.17 
1907 1915 22399.4 24365.3 1965.9 8.78 
1916 1924 29116.9 54377.7 25260.8 86.76 
1925 1933 43390.4 91626.0 48235.6 111.17 
1934 1942 36351.5 70519.6 34168.1 93.99 
Source : author’s elaboration; all values in thousands of Italian Lira 
 
We have seen in section 6 (Table 10) that a significant part of the investments were financed 
through fixed-interest loans with CDP. CDP at that time was a state-owned institutions 
channelling savings113 to the Municipalities. What was the impact of inflation on long term 
loans between CDP and Municipalities ? For sure CDP absorbed a part of the investment’s 
costs since it was being paid back in real terms less than thought. Since CDP was state owned, 
we make the assumption that from the municipality point of view this could be seen as a 
Transfer from the central state. Going further in that direction, what was the impact of 
inflation on the financial relations between CDP and the postal savers (or the CDP bond 
subscribers in the case of SACCP) ? Did the CDP absorbed the inflation impact since it had to 
pay higher interest rates to the postal savers ? Or was the inflation’s burden transferred to the 
savers (no major change in the interest rate paid to the savers).  
8.7 Intergenerational transfers 
Water and sanitation infrastructure has a very long lifetime. Indeed, a part of the sewers and 
water network built in the 1888-1924 years are still in use nowadays in Milan. Infrastructure 
                                                 
 
113
 Collected either through the postal offices networks or on the market through bond emissions in the case of 
the Sezione Autonoma per il Credito Comunale e Provinciale - SACCP 
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can be analysed as a capital stock which has been progressively built up and passed down to 
the next generation as a legacy. What are the intergenerational transfers associated to such a 
transfer ? How is the investment’s burden shared between the generations ? In other words 
analysis we do not look into the cost sharing within a generation (the user, the national tax 
payer, the local tax payer) but focus our attention on the intergenerational cost allocation only.  
In this paragraph we will give a first answer to these questions through a first model. Next 
paragraph is also focused on these questions adopting a revolving generation approach.  
We divided our investments time frame (1889-1924) in 4 time phases of 9 years each. For 
each time phase we computed the total CAPEX in water and sanitation infrastructure 
expressed in 1924 and 1942 Italian Lira114 (refer to table below). Nearly half of the 
investments appear to have been undertaken between 1907 to 1915 and significant fraction 
between 1898 and 1906 A first level of analysis tells us that the 1898-1915 generation paid 
most of the capital stock. 
Table 27 : CAPEX and debt service’s burden on 9 years time periods (1889-1942) 
years CAPEX Debt service 
 from to   1924 value 1942 value 1942 value 
1889 1897 38 001 75 309 20 749 
1898 1906 63 905 117 967 70 947 
1907 1915 148 872 241 031 159 666 
1916 1924 56 352 75 946 84 247 
1925 1933  0  0 70 092 
1934 1942  0  0 58 122 
 total   307 131 510 253 463 824 
Source : author’s elaboration, all values in thousand Italian Lira (1924 or 1942 value) 
 
In fact such an analysis is fallacious since the infrastructure was financed trough debt which 
by definition has the function of spreading the investments’ costs over various generations. 
We used the same debt service model previously described (§ 8.7 and appendix 2) and 
computed total debt service paid in six 9-years long time phases (4 investments phases from 
1889 to 1924 and 2 debt payback only time phases from 1925 to 1942). The reader should be 
aware that the debt service model is very basic and cannot fully represent the complexity of 
loans effectively subscribed by the municipality to finance its water and sanitation 
                                                 
 
114
 The index used comes from ISTAT serie storiche, tavola 21.6, available on http://seriestoriche.istat.it/  
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infrastructure. Nevertheless such a model is useful to appreciate the order of magnitude of 
each generation’s contribution. The debt service results (last column in the table above) show 
effectively that through deficit financing the investment’s burden is better spread over various 
time phases unloading the 1907-1915’s generation and charging more the 1916 – 1942 
generations. 
This kind of analysis is too basic to be satisfactory and next paragraph will focus on a more 
sophisticate analysis based on the concept of overlapping generations  
8.8 A basic overlapping generation model  
In the previous paragraph a “generation” consisted of “everyone who is alive at a given time” 
(Rosen and Gayer 2010, 466) (Lerner’s approach). This is a too schematic definition of a 
generation. On the contrary common sense tells us that various generations are alive at the 
same time. “Overlapping generation models” used to appreciate intergenerational aspects of 
deficit financing are based on such a conception. In an overlapping generation model a 
generation is composed of everyone who is born at the same time. 
Our model is conceived as schematized in 
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Figure 13 and Table 28 below and based on the following assumptions: 
• Our model cover 6 time phases of 9 years each.  
• Investments are made only in the first 4 time phases. Only debt payback takes place in 
the last two time phases. 
• Each generation is alive along 4 time phases, labelled “young”, “adult1”, “adult2” and 
“old” 
• We consider 7 generations crossing our time frame. 
• In each time phase there are four generations alive in the same time. The burden 
weighting on each generation is a quarter of the total burden on that time phase (as 
computed in the above paragraph   
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Figure 13 : Overlapping generation model – schematic view 
 
1889-1897 1898-1906 1907-1915 1916-1924 1925-1933 1934-1942 
 
     
      
 
  
 
  
      
 
   
  
      
  
 
  
 
      
Source : author’s elaboration 
Table 28 : overlapping generation model –schematic view 
  1889-1897 1898-1906 1907-1915 1916-1924 1925-1933 1934-1942 
young gen 3 gen 4 gen 5 gen 6     
adult 1 gen 2 gen 3 gen 4 gen 5 gen 6   
adult 2 gen 1 gen 2 gen 3 gen 4 gen 5 gen 6  
old gen0 gen 1 gen 2 gen 3 gen 4 gen 5 
Source : author’s elaboration 
 
Such an overlapping generation “model” has been run with two different inputs : respectively  
CAPEX and debt service. In the first run CAPEX (4th column in Table 27)   are taken as 
investments costs withouth considering any use of deficit financing. Total CAPEX in each 
time phase are then shared among the 4 generations alive in that time phase. The results are 
given in Table 29 and show unsurprisingly that the investment effort is mostly shared among 
the 3 generations (gen2, gen 3 and gen 4) which are alive in the two time phases with greater 
CAPEX (1898-1906 & 1907-1915 time phases ).  
Table 29 : results from the overlapping generation model based on CAPEX 
  1889-1897 1898-1906 1907-1915 1916-1924 1925-1933 1934-1942 total 
gen 0 18 827 0 0 0 0 0 18 827 
gen 1 18 827 29 492 0 0 0 0 48 319 
gen 2 18 827 29 492 60 258 0 0 0 108 577 
gen 3 18 827 29 492 60 258 18 986 0 0 127 563 
gen 4 0 29 492 60 258 18 986 0 0 108 736 
gen 5 0 0 60 258 18 986 0 0 79 244 
gen 6  0 0 0 18 986 0 0 18 986 
Source : author’s elaboration 
 
Gen 0 
Gen 1 
Gen 2 
Gen 3 
Gen 4 Gen 5 
Gen 6 
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The second run of the model has taken as input the debt service115 amounts (last column in 
Table 27)  instead of CAPEX ones. The results are given in Table 30 and show that the 
investment effort is quite well spread among generations (particularly among 5 generations 
from gen 2 to gen 6) with only the first two generations which contribute far less.  
 
Table 30 : results from the overlapping generation model based on debt service 
1889-1897 1898-1906 1907-1915 1916-1924 1925-1933 1934-1942 Total 
gen 0 5 187 0 0 0 0 0 5 187 
gen 1 5 187 17 737 0 0 0 0 22 924 
gen 2 5 187 17 737 39 917 0 0 0 62 841 
gen 3 5 187 17 737 39 917 21 062 0 0 83 902 
gen 4 0 17 737 39 917 21 062 17 523 0 96 238 
gen 5 0 0 39 917 21 062 17 523 14 531 93 032 
gen 6  0 0 0 21 062 17 523 14 531 53 115 
Source : author’s elaboration 
 
9 A long run perspective (1953 -2001) 
This section adds a long run perspective (1953-2000) to the detailed analysis undertaken in 
the previous sections. Once the rolling-up phase has gone how did the infrastructure was 
provided, expanded and financed over the 50 years after WWII ? In Italy intergovernmental 
financial relations between municipalities and the central state changed significantly through 
the 20th century (fiscal autonomy or dependence from central state transfers, balanced budget 
obligation or not). An overview of the evolution of intergovernmental financial relations in 
Italy is given in § 9.1 as a long run prosecution of what has been written in sections 5 and 6. 
The evolution of the regulation of the water and sanitation services in Italy is also described in 
§ 9.2 The afterwards paragraphs are focused instead on the financial flows of Milan’s water 
and sanitation service over the 1953-2000 time period. The (im)balance between Tariff 
revenues and OPEX is analysed in § 9.3. The investment policy is described too (§ 9.4). The 
intergenerational cost-sharing over the whole time frame (1888-2000) is estimated using two 
different methodologies (§ 9.5) .   
                                                 
 
115
 Debt service amounts are computed using CAPEX amounts as described in Appendix 2  
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9.1 Municipal finance in the new republic of Italy  
According to Giarda116 the various reforms of the Italian Municipal finance can be classified 
in 5 historical phases :  
a) 1950’s to early 1970’s budget-clearing grants and loans 
b) the 1970’s – fiscal centralization 
c) The renaissance after 1978 –till mid eighties 
d) The new squeeze: 1984-1992 
e) The turnaround of the Nineties 
1950’s to early 1970’s : budget-clearing grants and loans 
 
After WWII the financing system of local governments was collapsing both due to the price 
increases during and after the war and to the national government decision not to increase the 
cadastral values of housing and farm income. 
An attempt to solve such a critical situation was made with the 1952 Vanoni reform117 which 
was seen as temporary solution allowing to wait for a more ambitious reform expected to be 
launched later. The reform allowed the municipalities with budget imbalance both to obtain a 
general purpose grant and to subscribe loans with CDP to cover the residual budget 
imbalance118. Further legislative acts119 fixed each year the total amount of the general 
purpose grant. After 1955 no more amounts were allocated to the general purpose grant and 
municipalities were encouraged to subscribe “budget clearing loans” with CDP to solve their 
budget imbalance. These loans were subjected to the ministry of finance approval. Indeed an 
effect of the reform implementation  was “to give the national government the task to evaluate 
the appropriate matching of revenues and expenditures of individual local governments on a 
case by case basis”120. When the budget could not be made to balance at the local level 
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 This paragraph is largely inspired from a very interesting synthetic historical insight on intergovernmental 
financial relations in Italy written by Giarda (2005). 
117
 Legge 2 luglio 1952 n°603 
118
 It was asked to the municipality to commit to reduce budget imbalance. To be eligible to the grant a 
municipality had to increase at the maximum rate the additional levy on the land tax. To be eligible to the CDP 
loan a municipality had to prove that fiscal revenues were not high enough to cover 80% of the compulsory 
municipal expenses (Locatelli 2010, 78–79).   
119
 Legge 1954 n°635; Legge 1956 n°495, Legge 1958 n°30,  
120
 “National government functionaries were given the power to condition the efficacy of the budget approved by 
local governments councils on measures to be taken to balance the budget via tax increases and/or expenditure 
cuts.” (Giarda 2005) 
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(because rates had reached the maximum and/or spending could not be further reduced), a 
procedure was set for the national government to cover the gap between expenses and 
revenues. This procedure applied originally to a limited number of governments, but 
progressively extended to larger and larger numbers. In the later part of the Seventies, almost 
half of all local governments in the country had access to a so-called “budget clearing” grant” 
(Giarda 2005) which was implemented through the CDP special loans121 mentioned above. 
the 1970’s – fiscal centralization 
In 1973 a major fiscal reform122 took place in Italy (riforma Visentini). The reform cancelled 
‘temporarily’ municipal taxes : “all gone in a single stroke under the accusation that local 
taxes had very high collection costs and that diversity in tax rates violated the principles of 
horizontal equity. The yield of the abolished local taxes was substituted, for all local 
governments, by transfers from the national government budget planned to grow at a pre-
determined rate in the years from 1973 to 1977. The special “budget clearing” loans (or 
grants) also were set to grow at a predetermined rate of growth” (Giarda 2005). 
“The renaissance after 1978 –till mid eighties” 
In 1977 a reform of intergovernmental financing relations was made through the so called 
Decreti Stammati. Municipalities “were entitled, at the end of 1977, to determine almost 
freely the whole of their 1977 expenditure lines under the guarantee that the “budget clearing” 
loans would entirely cover the deficits resulting from the revised budgets. For 1978 and 
following years the various expenditure categories could increase according to some 
maximum admissible rate of growth over 1977 values. The “budget clearing” loan and all 
existing transfer programs from the national budget were repealed and substituted by a new 
all inclusive “equalizing grant” (equal to the difference between the admissible level of 
spending and the yield of the remaining local user fees and charges)123.” (Giarda 2005) 
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 “The “budget clearing” grant was administered under the form of special loans mostly by the national Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti. The debt service charges (interest and capital repayments under a French type amortization 
plan) accumulated from previous years budget clearing loans could be charged as “necessary expenditure” in 
next year budget and concur to the legitimate claims for the new “budget clearing” loan. So the loan was 
formally generating increases in the stock of local government debt, but it was everywhere considered as a 
current expenditures related grant, never to be refunded.” (Giarda 2005) 
122
 “The reform instituted a truly general personal progressive income tax, modified the corporation income tax, 
introduced the value added income tax, reformed taxation of capital income, redefined procedures for tax 
payments and tax assessments. The whole Italian tax system was overhauled and modernized.” (Giarda 2005) 
123
 “Local governments systematically outsmarted the national government agencies in charge of control on the 
evaluation of spending needs; the total transfer of resources to local governments was determined by adding up 
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“The new squeeze: 1984-1992” 
In the 80’s the fiscal centralization was judged negatively since it had contributed to a 
massive increase in the size of local governments expenditures. “In 1985 the size of the 
primary deficit of the Italian general government reached its all time maximum. Starting from 
1985 the growth of public spending in real terms was reduced to below 1% per year and taxes 
increased. Cash limits were imposed on local spending. The amount of equalization funds was 
strictly tied to a planned rate of inflation.” (Giarda 2005). 
“The turnaround of the Nineties” 
“At the beginning of the Nineties the options for decentralization became more attractive to 
political opinions. The opinion developed that expenditure control at the regional and local 
level would better be served by a financing structure that relied more on own tax revenues 
than on transfers from the national government”. In 1992 the country was experiencing a 
financial crisis and dramatic decisions were to be taken to raise taxes to reduce the public 
sector borrowing requirement. It was judged that municipal power had to bear a part of the 
polical cost of the public sector reduction. To do so, a policy switch had to be implemented 
from centralization to fiscal autonomy” (Giarda 2005). 
Indeed in 1992124 a tax on the value of housing and residential areas was instituted. At first 
the Imposta straordinaria sugli immobili (ISI) was conceived as a una tantum tax allowing 
the central government (Governo Amato) to face the public finance crisis. In the following 
year the tax was renamed as the “Imposta comunale sugli immobili” and became an 
autonomous municipal tax. It progressively became the main source of revenue of the Italian 
Municipalities. 
9.2 Ruling water and sanitation services  
Regulation of local public services 
The Legge Giolitti on the municipalisation of local public services was approved in 1903 and 
modified in 1925125 . The Azienda Municipalizzata legal framework was defined together with 
the legal procedure to be adopted by a municipality wishing to procede to a municipalisation. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
the individual “equalizing grants” computed, in each local government budget, as a difference between the 
admissible level of spending and the yield of users’ fees and charges.” (Giarda 2005) 
 
124
 decreto legislativo 11 luglio 1992, n. 333 
125
 Legge 29 marzo 1903 n°103, Regio Decreto 30 dicembre 1923 and  Regio Decreto 15 ottobre 1925 n°2578 
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Direct municipal provision of the service was still authorized, particularly for those 
municipalities which were already directly providing the service126  (Rotondi 1997).  
Despite various attemps through the decades after WWII to introduce a reform of the 1903 
law (Arcangeli 2000, 457),  it was only in 1990 that a significative reform of local public 
services was made (Legge 8 giugno 1990 n°142). According to the 1990 law local public 
services could be provided through the following 4 institutional forms : a) direct provision, 
b)concession to a private partner, c)through an azienda speciale127 (a new name for the 
azienda municipalizzata) or d) through a private plc partially or totally owned by the 
municipality.  
Water Tariff regulation 
After WWII a price regulation regime for various goods and services was implemented in 
Italy in order to fight against the high inflation of those years and preserve consumers’ 
purchase power. Indeed in 1944 the Comitato Interministeriale Prezzi (CIP) and the Comitato 
Provinciale Prezzi (CPP) were created (Decreto Legge 19 ottobre 1944 n°344). The water 
tariff regulation was subjected to those comittees. Water tariffs were set in an anti-inflation 
perspective with little regards to the cost of service (Arcangeli 2000, 301). As a consequence 
in most cities Tariff revenues were largely below the cost of the service. Furthermore only 
small percent tariff increase were authorized with the paradoxical effect that the cities starting 
with a low tariff were authorized smaller tariff increase than those starting with greater tariff. 
In 1968 (Dpr 18 Maggio 1968 n°126) it was established that the prices regulation guidelines 
were to be set by the CIPE (Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica) 
reducing the CIP’s responsibility only to detailed implementation of the CIPE’s guidelines. A 
total prices freeze was set at first after 1973 in order to fight against the price burst caused by 
the oil crisis. In 1974 such a rigid regulation was relaxed and new guidelines128 for the 
regulation of public services were adopted by CIPE (Arcangeli 2000, 301). The 1974 
regulation was based on the following conflicting principles : i) to refrain from major 
increases in the domestic water users’ bills in order to fight against inflation, ii) to allow an 
                                                 
 
126
 In Milan the water and sanitation services were already existing as municipal departments prior to the 1903 
law. Their institutional form was not impacted then by the 1903 reform. Conversely the Azienda Energetica 
Municipale (AEM) was created to operate the municipal power plants. 
127
 Modifications were made to the 1986 decree DPR n°902 which fixed the organisation and accounting rules of 
the Aziende Municipalizzate.  
128
 CIP 45/1974, CIP 46/1974 and Delibera 26/1975 
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indexation of the tariff on the inflation and on the water service operational and inv 
encourgestment real costs in order to progressively reduce water services yearly imbalances 
and iii) to disincentivize water consumption through a progressive blocks tariff(Bardelli and 
Muraro 2003, 349). It would have been tricky to meet both a inflation control objective and a 
tariff close to real cost of service. In fact the administrative process of a decentralized 
regulation through the CPP was so slow and complex that the implementation of the 1974 
guidelines did not fully take place (Arcangeli 2000, 301).  
After the 1979-1980 oil crisis, the control on public services tariff was reinforced again to 
avoid a snowball effect on inflation. In the 1980’s the macroeconomic tariff control was made 
a priority (particularly after 1984)  and it was judged acceptable and necessary to cover public 
services deficits with fiscal revenues from the general budget (Arcangeli 2000, 301).  
Regulation of the water sector & financing tools 
Water was defined as a public good in 1884 by the royal decree (Regio Decreto 2644 - 10 
agosto 1884) which established that a private company had to obtain a concession in order to 
withdraw water. The water sector was further regulated in 1933 (Testo Unico sulle acque 
pubbliche –Regio Decreto 1775 –11 dicembre 1933). 
In 1934 the water service was defined as a universal service which was to be provided every 
where in Italy (Regio Decreto 1265 del 27 luglio 1934). If a municipality was not able to 
finance by itself the investments needed, it could submit an investment plan to the central 
government (represented by the prefect). Once approved the investments would have been 
financed by the central government. The central government would own the infrastructures 
while the municipality would be responsible of the operation and maintenance. This is the 
“dualistic model where the investments are financed  by  the central government while the 
municipality provides the service” (Ermano 2012).   
In the first decades after WWII the same dual model was implemented. Indeed, according to a 
1949 law129, grants (from the central government to the municipalities) were available to 
finance public works (including water and sanitation infrastructure). Grants were to paid over 
35 years and covered a percentage of the total approved capital expenditures. Grants 
percentages varied depending on the kind of infrastructure and on the population size of the 
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 Legge Tupini, legge n°589 – 3 Settembre 1949,  
www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1949-08-03;589!vig=   
  
82
municipality. Concerning water and sanitation infrastructure yearly grants over 35 years could 
cover 5 to 3 % of the total approved capital expenditures respectively for municipalities with 
less than 5000 inhabitants and for those in the 30 000 – 150 000 inhabitants range. 
Municipalities in southern Italy could get an additional 1% in the grant percentage value 
(Locatelli 2010, 73).  Municipalities were allowed to subscribe loans either through the CDP 
or through any other bank. In case the loan was not subscribed with the CDP an additional 
grant could cover up to 40% of the difference between the loan interest rate130 and the CDP 
interest rate. For 35 years the yearly grant was paid directly to the lender (except in case the 
subscribed loan had a shorter duration and in that case the yearly grant was paid directly to the 
municipality). A central state guarantee could be given for the loans subscribed by 
municipalities from southern regions and small municipalities (less than 10 000 inhabitants) 
which did not have sufficient fiscal revenues (sovrimposta fondiaria and imposta di consumo) 
to give as a collateral (art 13).  Municipalities having a populations of more than 150 000 
inhabitants were not eligible to the grants. From the legislator’s point of view big 
municipalities had little need for governmental grants since they could borrow more easily 
than smaller ones. Furthermore in big cities the economies of density often made the 
investments profitable (Ermano 2012). 
In 1950 further financing tools were designed to finance public works (in particular roads and 
adduction and storage water infrastructure) in southern regions (legge 10 agosto 1950 n°646 
which created the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno and Legge 29 luglio 1957 n°635) and in 
underdeveloped areas of central and northern Italy (legge 10 agosto 1950 n°647 and Legge 29 
luglio 1957 n°634). 
In 1963 the central government’s role in financing the water and sanitation infrastructure was 
increased even more through the  Piano regolatore generale degli acquedotti – PRGA131. The 
public works ministry was given the responsibility of designing a national water and 
sanitation investment plan for the forthcoming 50 years and launching it through a ministerial 
decree. Financing solutions consisted both in yearly grants to the municipalities (as in the 
1949 law) and in direct payment of works with the central government acting as the 
contracting authority (article 5). In 1968 the financing mechanism associated to the PRGA 
was detailed (D.P.R. 11 marzo 1968 n°1090). Municipalities could choose between the 35 
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 Up to a maximum interest rate of 7%. 
131
 Legge 129, 4 febbraio 1963 - www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1963-02-04;129!vig=  
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years long yearly grants mechanism (as in the 1949 law) or a lump sum grant covering up to 
70 % of the total capital expenditures costs. Both sanitation and water investments included in 
the Piano regolatore generale degli acquedotti were eligible to those financing mechanisms. 
In case the 35 years spread grant solution was chosen, the yearly grant value was 4 % of the 
capital expenditures approved independently from the segmentation according to 
municipality’s population size included in the 1949 law. In 1977 with the creation of the 
Regions, the planning power previously given to the Public works ministry was transferred to 
the Regions (Ermano 2012). 
In 1976 sanitation and waste water treatment was also made compulsory (Legge Merli - Legge 
319, 10 maggio 1976). The planning and supervision power was given to the Regions while 
the operations were the municipalities’ responsibility. It was established that a waste water 
levy was to be paid by the users. Such a levy had to include both a sanitation element (canone 
di fognatura) and a waste water treatment element (canone di depurazione). The two levies 
amounts were fixed in 20 lira/m3 for domestic users. Higher amounts were authorised upon 
justification of higher costs of service up to the maximum amounts of 50 lira/m3 and 80 
lira/m3 respectively for the sanitation and waste water treatment part (article 16). The waste 
water treatment levy was to be paid in all municipalities were a waste water treatment plant 
was in operation even if it was not treating all the waste water produced. The two levies were 
to be billed and paid together with the water bills on a 80% of the drinking water volumes 
base. Municipalities could receive grants from the regions either through the time-spread 
formula (as in the 1949 law) or through capital expenditures lump-sum grants. Regions were 
autonomous in defining the details of the grant awarding process (article 19).  
9.3 Financial flows of Milan’s water and sanitation service 
In this paragraph we will analyse the (im)balance between water and sanitation revenues and 
operational expenditures132 between 1956 and 2000. Water and sanitation service as a whole 
had “Tariff” revenues which allowed to cover operational expenditures except between 1975 
and 1985 (refer to Table 31 and Appendix A for the detailed financial flows and 
methodological explanations). Our data show that starting in the 1970’s Tariff revenues were 
capped while operational expenditures increased significantly as inflation was very high in 
those years. As a consequence gross profit was negative. It was only in the 1990’s that tariff 
                                                 
 
132
 To the purpose of this paper OPEX does not include assets depreciation, loan’s amortization nor debt’s 
service cost. It represents the pure “cost of operations”. 
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revenues were high enough again to cover opex. Three kind of factors can explain our data : 
i)the water tariff regulation policy in Italy in those years aiming at controlling inflation (see 
§9.2), ii) the reduction in sold water volumes and iii) the impact of the 1976 Merli law on 
sanitation levies. Concerning the first point the reader shall refer to §9.2.  
A second explanation factor of Tariff revenues decrease is the trend in water consumption 
(Figure 14). Indeed Milan’s yearly water consumption peaked in 1972 (352 M cubic meters) 
and decreased significantly afterwards (247 M cubic meters in 2000). Decreasing water 
consumption can be put in relation with a variety of factors. In the 1980’s and 1990’s Milan’s 
economy shifted progressively from an industry based economy to a tertiary one. Indeed, 
Milan’s population peaked in the 1970’s and decreased afterwards (1.8 M inhabitants in 1970 
Vs 1.3 M in 2000). Tariff revenues of WSS are directly proportional to sold volumes while 
the cost of service (especially CAPEX) is mostly independent from the volume. From an 
environmental point of view a decrease in water consumption might increase WSS’s 
sustainability. Nevertheless from a financial point of view a decrease in sold volumes might 
jeopardize the WSS’s financial sustainability (Barraqué et al. 2011). 
Table 31 : Revenues, Opex and gross profit of Milan’s WSS (1956-2000), all values in Lira 
 water and sanitation 
year revenues opex gross profit 
1956 2 816 016 441 2 412 666 026 403 350 415 
1960 4 129 720 834 2 957 839 125 1 171 881 709 
1965 5 728 731 413 4 101 642 482 1 627 088 931 
1970 6 904 790 660 6 871 698 861 33 091 799 
1975 7 286 197 460 7 809 942 946 -523 745 486 
1980 14 647 478 995 18 329 273 360 -3 681 794 365 
1985 37 283 747 950 48 308 083 461 -11 024 335 511 
1990 63 334 093 303 61 066 857 635 2 267 235 668 
1995 60 372 081 708 58 008 451 527 2 363 630 181 
2000 107 337 122 233 66 531 867 852 40 805 254 381 
Source : autor’s elaboration based on Conto Consuntivo dell’anno… [various years] 
 
Last but not least, the regulation of the sanitation levy introduced by the 1976 Merli law had 
an impact on Tariff revenues. Indeed, since the creation of the sanitation service in 1888 a 
sanitation levy (much higher than opex) had been charged to the users by Milan’s 
municipality (section 7). After 1976133 Milan’s municipality could not charge anymore the 
water treatment part of the sanitation levy since no waste water treatment plant was in 
                                                 
 
133
 In fact revenues from the sanitation levy were very little already by 1975 preempting the 1976 regulation. 
  
85
operations. It could charge a sanitation levy only in the limitation imposed by the Merli law 
(see §9.2). 
The last column of Table 32 shows the trend in the average water price per cubic meter134 in 
real terms. In the 1970’s and 1980’s the price stayed nearly constant in real terms.  
Figure 14 : Yearly water consumption and population in Milan (1945-2011) 
 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Metropolitana Milanese internal database 
Table 32 : Water revenues, water consumption and average water tariff in real terms.  
  Yearly water revenues 
Yearly water 
consumption 
 Average water tariff 
  
year Lira Euro 2011 m3 Lira/m3 Euro 2011/m3 
1956 2 765 589 944 38 465 620 244 543 198 11 0.157 
1960 3 398 632 571 43 290 891 283 670 535 12 0.153 
1965 4 808 634 926 47 647 275 324 098 977 15 0.147 
1970 5 421 027 597 47 187 441 346 195 059 16 0.136 
1975 7 194 983 193 36 561 099 329 194 315 22 0.111 
1980 14 631 557 767 34 268 285 295 628 898 49 0.116 
1985 37 259 203 629 45 759 314 305 497 640 122 0.150 
1990 63 311 973 678 59 006 640 280 707 948 226 0.210 
1995 60 371 991 708 43 966 258 255 899 284 236 0.172 
2000 67 320 606 338 43 734 908 247 313 611 272 0.177 
 
 
Source : author’s elaboration, water revenues from Milan’s municipality conto consuntivo [various years], water 
consumption from Metropolitana Milanese internal database, monetary conversion index taken from ISTAT serie 
storiche  
                                                 
 
134
 This had been computed as the ratio between total revenues and yearly water withdrawal from the acquifer. 
Billed water volumes figures were lower for sure but were not available. Therefore average water tariff 
computed should only be taken as an order of magnitude. 
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9.4 Investments in water and sanitation infrastructure  
We have analysed three different data series : a) yearly water and sanitation CAPEXa (1888-
1924) from the municipal yearly financial relations (Figure 7 and Figure 17), b) ) yearly water 
and sanitation CAPEXb (1953-2001) from the municipal yearly financial relations (Figure 17 
and appendix B) and c) the yearly length of the water supply and sewer network (1888-2011) 
from the Metropolitana Milanese internal database (Figure 15 and Figure 16).  
The third data serie ((Figure 15 and Figure 16) shows that Milan’s water and sanitation 
networks’s expansion phase started in 1888 and did last until the end of the 1980’s. A slow 
down can be noticed however during WWI and WWII. In the decades after WWII a 
significant investment phase took place as the water supply network length increased from 
1100 km in 1945 to 2200 in 1988. The number of connections increased also steadily from 28 
201 in 1950 to 46 683 in 1988 (Motta 1989b). 
The CAPEX data series in Figure 17 also confirm that a significant investment phase took 
place in the 1960’s and in the late 1970’s and 1980’s. Figure 16 refers only to sanitation and 
water investments and does not include investment in waste water treatment plant which are 
shown in Appendix B.  
Yearly investments amounts were approved each year by the municipal council. There was 
little or no connection between the gross profit of the service and the planned investments. 
The water and sanitation service made their investment plan which was analysed by the 
municipal budget department and approved by the municipal council. Former employees of 
the municipal administration told us that it was quite frequent for the authorised capex 
amounts to be below the investment plan need since “investments in the water and sanitation 
infrastructure were not politically visible as those in nursery schools”. We do not have written 
sources to confirm that the municipality was under-investing in water and sanitation 
infrastructure. However two specific stories of under-investment are well known and worth to 
mention : a) the case of postponed investments to fight against poor drinking water quality 
and b) the case of postponed investments in waste water treatment plants.  
Concerning the first story it took nearly 20 years (from the 1970’s to 1994) for the Milan’s 
municipality to invest and fully respect drinking water quality standards (Box 4 below) “as 
these were not judged as priorities by the municipal administration” (Interview 1). Concerning 
the latter case, although it sounds incredible for a such a big European city, until 2005 Milan’s 
raw sewage was still discharged directly into the river system since no waste water treatment 
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plant existed. Indeed, investments in waste water treatment plants were constantly postponed 
undertaken in the 1990’s and 2000 years as we detail in the Box 5 below. 
Figure 15 : Milan’s water supply and sewer system length (1888-2011) 
 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Metropolitana Milanese, internal database 
 
Figure 16 : Milan’s water supply and sewer system yearly increase (1945-2011) 
 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Metropolitana Milanese, internal database 
 
What is striking is that in both the two cases of postponed investments described above the 
infrastructure was brought to completion only when facing a severe law obligation coming 
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from an upper level external authority (central government or European institutions). 
Meanwhile the investments were postponed for years or for decades as the municipal policy 
makers ignored the large externalities (both on the environment - River water pollution and on 
human health – poor quality drinking water) caused by such a non-investment decision. 
Figure 17 : Milan’s yearly water and sanitation CAPEX in thousand euro 2011 value (1888-1926 & 1956-
2000) 
 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Conto consuntivo dell’anno [various years] and ISTAT serie storiche 
 
Box 4 : post poned investments in drinking water treatment plan 
Until the early 1970’s it was thought that Milan’s underground water was clean and ready to drink. The only 
pollutant noticed at that time was hexavalent chromium and the wells which were not respecting the WHO limit 
of 50µg/l were put out of service. In the mid 1970’s major innovations took place in the water quality analysis 
technology and other pollutants are noticed in Milan’s groundwater : trichloroethylene, trichloromethane and 
other chlorinated solvents. A study commission (including experts from the public health department of the 
university of Milan) was created and established a temporary limit of 250 µg/l on chlorinated solvents. Such a 
limit was strentghned by the EU directive (80/770) converted in Italian law by the law n°183 16th April 1987 and 
the decree of the President of the Republic 24th May 1988 n°236.   
Although the groundwater water quality problem was known since the early 1970’s the problem was solved only 
in 1994 when effective investments135 (activated carbon technology  and stripping) were undertaken in a rush (a 
decree had allowed Milan’s municipality to adopt exceptionally fast procurement rules) to respect the law-limit 
(30 µg/l) prior than the deadline (8th May 1994). 
 
Box 5 : Milan’s waste water treatment plant 
The story of Milan waste water treatment plant started in 1972 when the Municipality chose to build two waste 
water treatment plants designed by the Municipal engineering department in Gratosoglio and Chiaravalle. A first 
tender took place in 1975 but a controversy arose since the Nosedo plant’s was to be localized in a sensible 
area136 (Massarutto et al. 2006). Furthermore “the project proposal was hindered by the protest of the residents of 
                                                 
 
135
 Prior to 1994 only minor solutions had been found (new pumping stations in an polluted part of the acquifer 
and deeper wells). 
136
 Due to Milan hydraulic system characteristics. 
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the concerned areas (i.e. NIMBY syndromei)”(Lobina and Paccagnan 2005). Between 1989 and 1998 various 
tenders were launched and building contractors selected. However the judicial enquiries during Tangentopoli “de 
facto blocked public works for several years” (Lobina and Paccagnan 2005). 
Nevertheless at the beginning of the 21th century Milan’s raw sewage was still discharged directly into the river 
system. Meanwhile an infraction procedure (concerning the waste water directive 91/271) was started in 2000 by 
the European Commission against the Italian Republic. Although Europe won the procedure, no pecuniary 
sanction was imposed . 
In 2000 special powers (commissario straordinario) were given to Milan’s mayor Gabriele Albertini to realize 
quickly the planned wastewater treatment plants.  They were brought to completion only in 2005.  
 
9.5 Intergenerational transfers and long run cost allocation 
Adopting a long run perspective from 1888 to 2000 one could wonder which generation did 
bear the most the investment’s burden. This paragraph is focused on such a question. To 
tackle it two data series are available : a) a CAPEXc data series composed of two distincts 
CAPEX data series (CAPEXa and CAPEXb) coming from the city’s yearly financial report 
and available respectively on the 1888-1924 and 1956-2000 time frame (Appendix B) and b) 
a virtual CAPEXd data series computed from the yearly network length associated to the 2011 
assets reconstruction value estimation made by Metropolitana Milanese (Appendix C). The 
two data series CAPEXc and CAPEXd are computed very differently and thus have very 
different values (Box below). The results are shown in the graphs in Appendix B and C (last 
pages of the present paper). 
Box 6 : Two methodologies and two long run data series 
A]Yearly CAPEXc values in Lira (nominal value) => ISTAT index => Yearly CAPEXc values in Euro 2011 
B]Yearly length => unitary assets value in euro 2011 => Yearly CAPEXd values in Euro 2011 
 
CAPEXc include not only investments in the networks but also in water pumping and water treatment units. It 
does not include waste water investments. It includes renovations and extraordinary maintenance  It is not 
available on the 1925-1955 time frame. It migh be biased by the change in the accounting rules through the 
various decades.It is largely influenced by the ISTAT conversion index which is more reliable for consumer 
goods than for public works. 
 
CAPEXd is mainly based on the year by year technical inventory which might be more reliable than the 
accounting data. It refers only to the sewer system and water network and does not include water pumping and 
water treatment units. It does not include either the renovations and extraordinary maintenances. The monetary 
value of CAPEXd is based on the (wrong) assumption that cost of works staid constant through  the years. It is 
largely sensitive to the 2011 assets reconstruction value estimated by Metropolitana Milanese 
 
Table 32 summarizes the main results for the two data series in terms of cumulative CAPEX 
over 10 years time phases from 1887 to 2006. It is not surprising that the figures from the two 
data series are very different since they are based on very different assumptions. Nevertheless, 
the peak investment decade is the 1957-1966 one according to both series. Conversely 
CAPEXc seems to underestimate the values prior to WWII when compared to CAPEXd. 
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Indeed second higher investment decade is the 1907-1916 one according to the CAPEXd serie 
and the 1977-1986 according to the CAPEXc data serie.  
Table 33 : CAPEX in the long run over 10 years periods in M euro 2011 
 km  M Euro 2011  
  Length   CAPEXd  CAPEXc   
  water sanitation water sanitation total Rank water sanitation total Rank 
1887-1896 83 77 46.6 132.9 179.5 0 8.8 25.0 33.8 8 
1897-1906 113 87 63.1 151.5 214.5 7 19.2 50.4 69.6 6 
1907-1916 202 232 113.0 401.0 514.0 2 25.5 108.7 134.1 5 
1917-1926 102 85 57.1 147.3 204.3 8 20.0 30.1 50.1 7 
1927-1936 227 189 127.0 327.5 454.5 3 - - -  
1937-1946 134 57 75.0 98.0 173.1 10 - - -  
1947-1956 327 119 183.1 205.6 388.6 5 - - -  
1957-1966 598 238 334.8 412.5 747.3 1 228.5 287.4 515.9 1 
1967-1976 232 151 130.0 261.4 391.4 4 202.1 127.8 329.8 3 
1977-1986 171 109 95.7 189.4 285.1 6 226.5 277.4 503.9 2 
1987-1996 102 70 56.9 120.8 177.7 9 154.4 79.2 233.6 4 
1997-2006 54 52 30.2 89.3 119.5 11 - - -  
Source : author’s elaboration 
 
In section 6 and § 9.1 we described some major aspects of the Italian municipal finance 
legislative framework. In §9.2 we summarized also the regulation and financing tools of the 
Italian water sector after WWII. Depending on the decade considered the Tariff regulation, 
the central government grants availability and the borrowing rules changed significantly. 
Although Milan’s municipality was quite a virtous one in the decades of harsh financial crisis 
for Italian municipalities, for sure budget clearing grants and loans were largely used both to 
finance ordinary budget deficit and investments. Following the schematization made by 
Giarda (2005) and summarized in § 9.1 the municipal budget was progressively fuelled 
mainly by central government’s transfers (initially through CDP budget clearing loans and 
later by annual transfers tout court). Specific grants were also available for investments in 
water and sanitation as described in the §9.2. 
To fully investigate the intergenerational transfers associated to these investments additional 
data and further research would be needed on the transfers (grants, loans) received from the 
central government and on the deficit-financing tools implemented by Milan’s municipality in 
the wider context of Italian Public finance rules.  
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10 Conclusion 
At the end of the 19th century and in the early decades of the 20th century Milan was facing a 
massive economic development which implied a huge demographic pressure due to a classical 
process of migration from the rural areas to the city. As a consequence, the municipality had 
to rule a fast urban expansion and to find a solution to provide at least the basic infrastructure 
and services. In particular the rolling-up of modern water and sanitation infrastructure could 
not be postponed anymore without risking major epidemics and other negative impacts on 
health. 
At first the solution of bringing spring water from the Brembo regions to the city was chosen 
but it required the support of the central government to bypass the resistance from the Brembo 
River inhabitants. Such a support did not come. Thus, Milan chose local groundwater 
resources instead of far away one. Furthermore, doing so, Milan’s municipality chose a fully 
autonomous solution which required little approval or support from the upper level of 
government.  
Water and sanitation in Italy is mainly a municipal story and the Milan’s water and sanitation 
infrastructure can be seen as the paradigm of a municipal infrastructure. To analyse how such 
an infrastructure has been financed one has first to understand the nature of the financial 
integovernmental relations between the municipalities and the central government. The newly 
born Italian state was facing an uneasy financial situation and in consequence it imposed a 
tight financial discipline to the municipalities (ordinary budget balance, no transfers from the 
central government, borrowing constraints). Furthermore, as municipal fiscal revenues relied 
mainly on non autonomous fiscal sources shared with the central government, a growing 
fiscal competition took place together with a progressive reduction of the fiscal revenues left 
to municipalities. In the same time the compulsory expenses to be made by municipalities 
were increasing. 
In such a tight financial situation how did Milan’s municipality manage to finance a such a 
costly water and sanitation infrastructure ? A first idea could have been to capture land added 
value created by such an infrastructure. We showed however that this kind of tools played 
only a minor role in the financing of Milan’s urban infrastructure since the legislative 
expropriation or fiscal tools available in Italy were not powerful enough. Milan’s municipality 
was facing then the classical debate of defining an investment policy having schematically to 
choose between three options : i) to postpone the investment, ii) to increase prelevements on 
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the present generation or iii) to borrow and thus to spread the investment’s cost on the 
forthcoming generation. However, we already told that postponing the provision of a modern 
water and sanitation service was not truly an option due to the public health externalities it 
would have implied. In turn, the classical public finance dilemma on deficit financing (option 
i) or option ii)) was lively.  
Indeed, in 1891 Milan’s policy makers where already pointing out the implicit 
intergenerational transfers caused by deficit financing : “ To justify a loan it is not sufficient 
to tell that public infrastructure will benefit mostly our grandchild. Since we are confiscating 
future revenues, we also have to demonstrate that no other infrastructure needs will appear in 
the future and that we provide nowadays to all the future needs, including the unprevisible 
ones137” Nevertheless, infrastructure deficit financing was not avoidable as “it would not be 
possible to increase taxes to cover each year those expenses. Neither to spread those 
extraordinary and urgent public works through the years in order to finance them on the 
yearly budget’s surplus would be a sound decision since those works cannot be postponed138”. 
Indeed, we have shown that deficit financing (both through bond and loans) was a major 
financing tool used to cover in the short run the investments’ costs. In the long run debt was 
paid back both by users (Tariff) and by local tax payers (Tax) as our detailed analysis of the 
water and sanitation service financial flows showed. The combined effect of high inflation 
and long term deficit financing tools at fixed interest rate played a key role in absorbing a part 
of the investments’ costs.  
In the public policy debate, financing an infrastructure through debt is often considered as a 
way of avoiding costs on the present generation and transferring them on the forthcoming 
ones. We argue that the issue of intergenerational transfers is more complex and that using the 
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 Such a position was taken within a report which argued in favour of a fiscal reform of Milan’s excise duty 
system (§5.4). « a giustificarli [i prestiti] non basta affermare che i vantaggi delle grandi opere pubbliche 
ridondano in gran parte sui nipoti ; occorre dimostrare che a tempi nuovi non corrispondano nuove aspirazioni, 
e che noi provvediamo oggi a tutte le aspirazioni anche le non prevedibili di quell’avvenire di cui andiamo man 
mano confiscando i redditi. »(Municipio di Milano 1891b, 42). 
138
 “Già venne altra volta accennato come non sarebbe praticamente possibile il richiedere ad inasprimenti di 
tasse o a tasse nuove i mezzi necessari per far fronte annualmente a simili spese. Non si riuscirebbe a nulla di 
pronto ed efficace. Per l’esecuzione di opere straordinarie ed urgenti ad un tempo come quelle sottoposte al 
vostro esame, il sistema di provvedervi ripartitamente in una lunghissima serie di anni, si da potervi far fronte 
con le risorse ordinarie di bilancio, non risponde ai bisogni che le dette opere reclamano, né al loro 
coordinamento, nè a quell’incremento della vita cittadina che non soffre soverchi ritardi nei miglioramenti di 
pubblici servizi e nello sviluppo edilizio” (Municipio di Milano 1907a, v) 
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concept of overlapping generations is useful to analyse how the investment’s burden was 
shared among various generations.  
We are also convinced that when considering intergenerational transfers, one should also 
consider the intergenerational impact of the not-investing decision both in terms of 
investments burden transferred to the future generation and in terms of the implied 
externalities139. The two stories of postponed investments in waste water treatment and 
drinking water treatment in Milan are paradigmatic of a public policy failure in implementing 
sound and sustainable investment policy choices. Indeed, not only the investments costs of the 
drinking water treatment plant and waste water treatment units were transferred to the 1990’s 
and 2000 generations (in both cases with higher costs due to the need to invest in a haste) but 
also negative externalities took place for various decades with negative impacts on public 
health (poor quality water drunk for 20 years) and on the environment (river and sea water 
pollution).  
Water and sanitation infrastructure is made of long lasting assets and the investment policy of 
a water and sanitation service has long lasting impacts on the future generations. Indeed, a 
significant part of the infrastructure built in Milan in the early 20th century is still in 
operations nowadays. In economic terms past generations left us a rich infrastructure capital 
stock. Nowadays asset management is a key policy concern in WSS services in Western 
Europe. What is the appropriate level of investment in the networks ? Should it be a curative 
policy consisting in repairing when leakages take place or a preventive one consisting in 
maintaining at the same level such a capital stock and transmitting it as an heritage to the 
future generations? How will the future generation evaluate the investment policy of 
nowadays water services? This is an open question. 
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 Our way of thinking is consistent with the 3E methodology on WSS’s sustainability (as defined by Correia 
2001; Barraqué 2003a; Barraqué 2005; Lejars and Canneva 2009) and with Massarutto (2002; 2004; 2007) frame 
of analysis of intergenerational relations in WSS 
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Appendix 1 
Comparing capital expenditures in water and sanitation infrastructure and in urban transformation (city’s development masterplan) 
 capital expenditures  
  Lira, nominal value    Lira, inflated to 1924 value  
  
water sanitation total 
Piano 
regolatore 
Inflation 
index water sanitation total 
Piano 
regolatore 
1891 592010 927015 1519025 5243878 4.5899 2 717 267 4 254 906 6 972 173 24 068 876 
1892 116 031 879 851 995 882 1 267 337 4.6298 537 200 4 073 534 4 610 734 5 867 517 
1893 281 163 1 290 978 1 572 141 696 904 4.7325 1 330 604 6 109 553 7 440 157 3 298 098 
1894 309 826 1 033 882 1 343 708 1 386 088 4.7536 1 472 789 4 914 661 6 387 450 6 588 908 
1895 300 157 739 966 1 040 123 1 754 635 4.7803 1 434 841 3 537 259 4 972 100 8 387 682 
1896 364 915 1 005 871 1 370 786 352 196 4.8018 1 752 249 4 829 991 6 582 240 1 691 175 
sub total (1891-1896) 1 964 102 5 877 563 7 841 665 10 701 038   9 244 949 27 719 906 36 964 855 49 902 255 
                    
1900 33 220 956 687 989 907 586 548 4.8345 160 602 4 625 103 4 785 705 2 835 666 
1901 381 752 828 236 1 209 988 542 096 4.8290 1 843 482 3 999 550 5 843 032 2 617 782 
1902 424 988 1 032 980 1 457 967 638 559 4.8620 2 066 291 5 022 346 7 088 638 3 104 674 
1903 424 955 838 634 1 263 589 637 493 4.7220 2 006 636 3 960 032 5 966 668 3 010 242 
1904 517 063 1 090 894 1 607 957 629 576 4.6652 2 412 204 5 089 237 7 501 441 2 937 098 
1905 680 737 1 311 434 1 992 171 654 691 4.6601 3 172 303 6 111 416 9 283 718 3 050 926 
1906 1 180 584 1 973 434 3 154 018 808 469 4.5751 5 401 290 9 028 659 14 429 949 3 698 827 
1907 532 507 2 327 811 2 860 318 1 339 938 4.3689 2 326 469 10 169 975 12 496 444 5 854 055 
1908 1 336 535 1 997 329 3 333 863 2 596 999 4.4141 5 899 597 8 816 408 14 716 006 11 463 413 
sub total (1900-1908) 5 512 341 12 357 439 17 869 780 8 434 369   25 288 875 56 822 727 82 111 602 38 572 682 
                    
Total  9 440 545 24 112 565 33 553 110 29 836 445   43 778 774 112 262 539 156 041 313 138 377 192 
 
1891-1896 data from from Atti Municipio di Milano 1896-1897 
1901-1908 water and sanitation data from Conto consuntivo dell’anno… – various years 
1901-1908 Piano regolatore data from Berbenni (2010, 188) 
Inflation index from ISTAT serie storiche, tavola 21.6, available on http://seriestoriche.istat.it/  
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Appendix 2 
 
Sensitivity analysis of the debt model to the amortization duration (35, 50, 70 years) 
 
 a b c d e = a-b f = a - c  g = a - d 
years Gross profit 
Debt service 50 
years 
Debt service 35 
years 
Debt service 70 
years Net Profit (50) Net Profit (35) Net Profit (70) 
1889                   -                48 360   54 500 44 266 -          48 360   -          54 500    -          44 266    
1890 -          18 325              87 020   97 893 79 772 -        105 345   -        116 218    -          98 097    
1891 -            5 697            140 248   157 547 128 715 -        145 945   -        163 244    -        134 412    
1892                 415            197 509   221 519 181 502 -        197 094   -        221 104    -        181 087    
1893 -               383            289 726   324 661 266 436 -        290 109   -        325 044    -        266 819    
1894 -            7 720            357 825   400 204 329 573 -        365 545   -        407 924    -        337 293    
1895 -            3 074            419 318   467 991 386 869 -        422 392   -        471 065    -        389 943    
1896 -          21 422            494 255   550 658 456 653 -        515 677   -        572 080    -        478 075    
1897 -          48 616            584 609   650 368 540 769 -        633 225   -        698 984    -        589 385    
1898 -          25 809            695 965   773 350 644 375 -        721 774   -        799 159    -        670 184    
1899          100 333            780 163   865 199 723 472 -        679 830   -        764 866    -        623 139    
1900          288 614            831 981   920 134 773 212 -        543 367   -        631 520    -        484 598    
1901          502 772            897 015   989 704 835 222 -        394 243   -        486 932    -        332 450    
1902          613 368            976 856   1 075 645 910 997 -        363 488   -        462 277    -        297 629    
1903          751 180          1 042 925   1 145 660 974 435 -        291 745   -        394 480    -        223 255    
1904        1 013 260          1 129 931   1 238 943 1 057 256 -        116 671   -        225 683    -          43 996    
1905        1 008 297          1 240 118   1 357 933 1 161 575 -        231 821   -        349 636    -        153 278    
1906        1 338 348          1 422 986   1 558 346 1 332 746 -          84 638   -        219 998                 5 602    
1907                   -            1 584 190   1 733 473 1 484 667 -      1 584 190   -      1 733 473    -      1 484 667    
1908        1 659 038          1 773 173   1 939 153 1 662 519 -        114 135   -        280 115    -            3 481    
1911        3 535 815          2 573 559   2 812 875 2 414 014          962 256            722 940           1 121 801    
1914        2 387 493          3 124 008   3 394 267 2 943 836 -        736 515   -      1 006 774    -        556 343    
1917        2 987 121          3 294 262   3 539 304 3 130 901 -        307 141   -        552 183    -        143 780    
1920        3 953 941          3 512 238   3 735 320 3 363 517          441 703            218 621             590 424    
1923        6 779 185          4 481 915   4 770 180 4 289 738        2 297 270          2 009 005           2 489 447    
1924        8 350 890          5 168 748   5521801.003 4933379.102        3 182 142          2 829 089           3 417 511    
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Appendix 3a : Nuovi quartieri al Foro Bonaparte 
 
Source : Poggi (1911, 74) 
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Appendix 3b : The Codara 1924 sanitation masterplan 
 
Source : (Gentile, Brown, and Spadoni 1990) 
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Appendix 4 
 
Table 34 : Capital invested in water and sanitation and debt service re-invoiced(conto consuntivo 1911) 
 All amounts in 
[Lira] 
Water  
  
Sanitation  
  
Total 
  
 Funding source 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
1906 - 1907 CdP 
loan140  3 600 000 144 000 7 200 000 288 000 10 800 000 432 000 
1890-1900  
expenses141  1 500 000 60 000 6 800 000 272 000 8 300 000 332 000 
Total  5 100 000 204 000 14 000 000 560 000 19 100 000 764 000 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Atti del Municipio di Milano 1912-1913.   
 
 
Table 35 : Capital invested in water and sanitation and debt service re-invoiced(conto consuntivo 1914) 
 All amounts in 
[Lira] 
Water  
  
Sanitation  
  
Total 
  
 Funding source 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
1906 - 1907 CdP 
loan142  5 609 000 224 360 17 200 000 688 000 22 809 000 912 360 
1890-1900  
expenses143  1 500 000 60 000 6 800 000 272 000 8 300 000 332 000 
**capital 
amortization 11 900 000 595 000 38 000 000 950 000 49 900 000 1 545 000 
Total (incl.**) 19 009 000 879 360 62 000 000 1 910 000 81 009 000 2 789 360 
Total (unincl **) 7 109 000 284 360 24 000 000 960 000 31 109 000 1 244 360 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Atti del Municipio di Milano 1915-1916.  
 
                                                 
 
140
 Including amounts on the extraordinary budget 
141
 On the 1886 loan (prestito unificato) and on the 1890 mortgage loan (mutuo ipotecario) with Cassa di 
Risparmio 
142
 Including amounts on the extraordinary budget 
143
 On the 1886 loan (prestito unificato) and on the 1890 mortgage loan (mutuo ipotecario) with Cassa di 
Risparmio 
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Table 36 : Capital invested in water and sanitation and debt service re-invoiced(conto consuntivo 1917) 
 All amounts in 
[Lira] 
Water  
  
Sanitation  
  
Total 
  
 Funding source 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
1906 - 1907 CdP 
loan144  6 750 000 270 000 23 400 000 936 000 30 150 000 1 206 000 
1890-1900  
expenses145  1 500 000 60 000 6 800 000 272 000 8 300 000 332 000 
1901-1917 
expenses146 11 345 000 567 250 31 873 200 1 593 660 43 218 200 2 160 910 
Total  19 595 000 897 250 62 073 200 2 801 660 81 668 200 3 698 910 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Atti del Municipio di Milano 1919-1920.  
 
Table 37 : Capital invested in water and sanitation and debt service re-invoiced(conto consuntivo 1920) 
 All amounts in 
[Lira] 
Water  
  
Sanitation  
  
Total 
  
 Funding source 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
1906 - 1907 CdP 
loan147  6 750 000 270 000 23 400 000 936 000 30 150 000 1 206 000 
1890-1900  
expenses148  1 500 000 60 000 6 800 000 272 000 8 300 000 332 000 
1901-1920 
expenses149 11 345 000 567 250 31 873 200 1 593 660 43 218 200 2 160 910 
**capital 
amortization   979725   1200000  2 179 725 
Total (incl.**)  1 876 975  4 001 660  5 878 635 
Total (unincl **) 19 595 000 897 250 62 073 200 2 801 660 81 668 200 3 698 910 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Atti del Municipio di Milano 1923-1924.  
 
 
                                                 
 
144
 Including amounts on the extraordinary budget 
145
 On the 1886 loan (prestito unificato) and on the 1890 mortgage loan (mutuo ipotecario) with Cassa di 
Risparmio 
146
 On the 1886 loan (prestito unificato) and on the 1890 mortgage loan (mutuo ipotecario) with Cassa di 
Risparmio 
147
 Including amounts on the extraordinary budget 
148
 On the 1886 loan (prestito unificato) and on the 1890 mortgage loan (mutuo ipotecario) with Cassa di 
Risparmio 
149
 On the 1886 loan (prestito unificato) and on the 1890 mortgage loan (mutuo ipotecario) with Cassa di 
Risparmio 
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Table 38 : Capital invested in water and sanitation and debt service re-invoiced(conto consuntivo 1922) 
 All amounts in 
[Lira] 
Water  
  
Sanitation  
  
Total 
  
 Funding source 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
1906 - 1907 CdP 
loan150  6 750 000 270 000 23 400 000 936 000 30 150 000 1 206 000 
1890-1900  
expenses151  1 500 000 60 000 6 800 000 272 000 8 300 000 332 000 
1901-1922 
expenses152 14 400 000 720 000 36 240 000 1 812 000 50 640 000 2 532 000 
Total  22 650 000 1 050 000 66 440 000 3 020 000 89 090 000 4 070 000 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Atti del Municipio di Milano 1923-1924.  
 
Table 39 : Capital invested in water and sanitation and debt service re-invoiced(conto consuntivo 1924) 
 All amounts in 
[Lira] 
Water  
  
Sanitation  
  
Total 
  
 Funding source 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
Capital 
invested  
Debt 
service 
1906 - 1907 CdP 
loan153  6 750 000 270 000 23 400 000 936 000 30 150 000 1 206 000 
1890-1900  
expenses154  1 500 000 60 000 6 800 000 272 000 8 300 000 332 000 
1901-1924 
 expenses155 11 345 000 875 000 39 560 000 1 978 000 50 905 000 2 853 000 
**capital 
amortization156 20 000 000 1 000 000 70 000 000 2 100 000 90 000 000 3 100 000 
Total (incl.**) 39 595 000 2 205 000 139 760 000 5 286 000 179 355 000 7 491 000 
Total (unincl **) 19 595 000 1 205 000 69 760 000 3 186 000 89 355 000 4 391 000 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Atti del Municipio di Milano 1923-1924.  
 
                                                 
 
150
 Including amounts on the extraordinary budget 
151
 On the 1886 loan (prestito unificato) and on the 1890 mortgage loan (mutuo ipotecario) with Cassa di 
Risparmio 
152
 On the 1886 loan (prestito unificato) and on the 1890 mortgage loan (mutuo ipotecario) with Cassa di 
Risparmio 
153
 Including amounts on the extraordinary budget 
154
 On the 1886 loan (prestito unificato) and on the 1890 mortgage loan (mutuo ipotecario) with Cassa di 
Risparmio 
155
 On the 1886 loan (prestito unificato) and on the 1890 mortgage loan (mutuo ipotecario) with Cassa di 
Risparmio 
156
 The capital amortization line “amortizzo” was inserted in the accounting chapters only per memoria to quote 
the figures but it does not contribute to the debt service re-invoiced to water and sanitation accounting chapters. 
The water and sanitations figures of this line were computed by the municipality respectively with a 5% 
amortization coefficient (meaning a 20 years long amortization) and a 3% amortization coefficient (meaning a 33 
years long amortization). 
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Appendix A 
Milan’s water and sanitation service financial flows, all values in Lira nominal values 
water sanitation water and sanitation 
year revenues opex gross profit revenues opex gross profit revenues opex gross profit 
1956 2 765 589 944 2 199 063 707 566 526 237 50 426 497 213 602 319 -163 175 822 2 816 016 441 2 412 666 026 403 350 415 
1960 3 398 632 571 2 657 899 851 740 732 720 731 088 263 299 939 274 431 148 989 4 129 720 834 2 957 839 125 1 171 881 709 
1965 4 808 634 926 3 746 219 855 1 062 415 071 920 096 487 355 422 627 564 673 860 5 728 731 413 4 101 642 482 1 627 088 931 
1970 5 421 027 597 6 487 274 546 -1 066 246 949 1 483 763 063 384 424 315 1 099 338 748 6 904 790 660 6 871 698 861 33 091 799 
1975 7 194 983 193 7 041 242 948 153 740 245 91 214 267 768 699 998 -677 485 731 7 286 197 460 7 809 942 946 -523 745 486 
1980 14 631 557 767 15 758 370 714 -1 126 812 947 15 921 228 2 570 902 646 -2 554 981 418 14 647 478 995 18 329 273 360 -3 681 794 365 
1985 37 259 203 629 43 411 843 634 -6 152 640 005 24 544 321 4 896 239 827 -4 871 695 506 37 283 747 950 48 308 083 461 -11 024 335 511 
1990 63 311 973 678 47 984 190 898 15 327 782 780 22 119 625 13 082 666 737 -13 060 547 112 63 334 093 303 61 066 857 635 2 267 235 668 
1995 60 371 991 708 44 499 809 651 15 872 182 057 90 000 13 508 641 876 -13 508 551 876 60 372 081 708 58 008 451 527 2 363 630 181 
2000 67 320 606 338 49 662 574 585 17 658 031 753 40 016 515 895 16 869 293 267 23 147 222 628 107 337 122 233 66 531 867 852 40 805 254 381 
 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Conto consuntivo dell’anno [various years]   
To the purpose of this paper OPEX does not include assets depreciation, loan’s amortization nor debt’s service cost. It represents the pure “cost 
of operations”. 
  
108
Appendix B 
Yearly CAPEX expressed in thousand euro 2011 value 
 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Conto consuntivo dell’anno [various years] and inflated using an index from ISTAT serie storiche 
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Appendix C 
Yearly capex in euro 2011 value (1988-2011), computed from yearly network length and 2011 reconstruction assets values. 
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Source : author’s elaboration 
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